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U N DER THE W EATHER:  
 
G OVERNMENT INSURANCE AND THE REGULATION OF 
CLIMATE  RISK S 
 
 
 
O mri Ben - S hahar and K yle D. Logue *  
 
A bs tract  
 
This  A rticle explores the role of  ins urance as  s ubs titute f or 
direct regulation of  ris ks  posed by s evere w eather.  In  pricing 
the ris k of  human activity along the predicted path of 
s torms , ins urance can provide incentives  f or ef f icient 
location decis ions  as  w ell as  f or  cos t - j us tif ied mitigation 
ef f ort  i n building cons truction and inf ras tructure . Currently, 
how ever,  much  ins urance f or s evere w eather ris ks  is  
provided and  heavily  s ubs idized by the government. The 
Article demons trates  tw o primary dis tortions  aris ing f rom 
the government’s  dominance in thes e  ins urance markets. 
First, the s ubs idies  are allocated dif f erentially acros s  
hous eholds , res ulting in a s ignif icant regres s ive 
redis tribution, f avoring af f luent homeow ners  in coas tal 
communities. The Article provides s ome  empirical meas ure s  
of  this  ef f ect. Second, the s ubs idies  induce exces s ive 
development ( and redevelopment )  of  s torm - s tricken and 
eros ion - prone areas.   While political ef f orts  to s cale dow n 
the ins urance s ubs idies  have s o f ar f ailed, by exposing the 
unintended cos ts  of  government - s ubs idized ins urance this  
A rticle contributes  to reevaluation of  the s ocial regulation of  
w eather ris k.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
H umanity has  f igured out all too w ell how  to change the w eather 
unintentionally. 1  But it is  s till a long w ay f rom learning how  to engineer 
the w eather deliberately. We do not know  how  to s teer damaging s torms  
aw ay f rom populated areas , how  to moderate the torrential rain s  that 
produce damaging  f loods , or how  to end droughts . The technology to 
mitigate s evere w eather , especially large s torms ,  is  s till s cience f iction .2  
What w e can do , how ever,  is w eather the s torm. Using the tools  
of  prediction and rational planning, w e  can regulate human exposure  to 
the r i s k  of  bad w eather.  Using his torical data and predictive models , 
s cientis ts  and policymakers  can anticipate weather patterns and take 
s teps to reduce w eather - related harm s . Our society  may not be able to  
control the w ind, the rain ,  or lightning, but w e  can build s turdier homes  
on higher ground  w ith s tronger  roof s  and  lightning rods . By direct ing  
airplanes and s hips away f rom dangerous  s torms ,  or by build ing  dams  
and  levies , w e  are regulat ing  behavior in the s hadow — under the cloud —
of  dis obedient  w eather patterns.  
T he term “ n atura l dis as ter ” is thus  a mis nomer . A ll weather 
catas trophes are the res ult of  a combination of  natural f orces  and human 
policies. Although  t he natural f orces  component is  uncontrollable, the 
devas tating outcomes  can be mitigated  by appropriate human policies. 
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" ! T h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  s c i e n t i s t s  w h o  s t u d y  t h e  s u b j e c t  r e g a r d  t h e  d a t a  a s  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  s h o w  t h a t  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  i s  h appenin g  a n d  t h a t  t h a t  i t  i s  l a r g e l y  a n t h r opoge n i c. 
S e e  U.S  G L O B A L  C H A N G E  R E S E A R C H  P R O G R A M ,  C L I M A T E  C H A N G E  I M P A C T S  I N  
T H E  U N I T E D  S T A T E S :  T H E  T H I R D  N A T I O N A L  C L I M A T E  A S S E S S M E N T  ( J e r r y  M. 
M e l i l l o  e t  a l. e d s., 2 0 1 4 ) ;  C o n s e n s u s :  9 7 %  o f  c l i m ate s c i e ntists a g r e e ,  N A T ’ L  
A E R O N A U T I C S  &  S P A C E  A D M I N ,  h t tp://c l i m a t e.na s a.go v / s c i e n t i f i c - c o n s e n s u s  ( l a s t  
v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 ,  2 0 1 4 ) . 
2  B e t w e e n  1 9 6 2  a n d  1 9 8 3 ,  a  j o i n t  proj e c t  b e t w e e n  t h e  U.S. N a v y  a n d  t h e  U.S. 
D epartm e n t  o f  C o m m e r c e  u n d e r t o o k  a  m a s s i v e  e xperim e n t  t o  d e t e r m i n e  i f  c l o u d  
s e e d i n g  t e c h n o l o g y ,  w h i c h  h a d  s h o w n  s u c c e s s  i n  a l t e r i n g  r a i n f a l l  l e v e l s ,  c o u l d  b e  
u s e d  t o  r e d u c e  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  h u r r i c a n e s.  T e r m e d  P r o j e c t  S T O R M F U R Y ,  t h e  i d e a  
w a s  t o  s e e d  t h e  c l o u d s  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e  e y e  o f  t h e  h u r r i c a n e  t o  c r e a t e  w i n d  patte r n s  
t h a t  w o u l d  c u t  a g a i n s t  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  h u r r i c a n e ,  r e d u c i n g  i t s  i n t e n s i t y.  I t  d i d n ’ t  
w o r k. H. E. W i l l o u g h b y ,  D. P. J o r g e n s e n ,  R. A. B l a c k ,  &  S. L. R o s e n t h a l ,  P r o j e ct 
S T O R M F U R Y ,  A  S c i e ntifi c  C h r o n i c l e ,  1 9 6 2 - 1 9 8 3 ,  6 6  B U L L . A M . M E T E O R . S O C ’ Y  
5 0 5  ( 1 9 8 5 ) ;  s e e  a l s o  S T E V E N  M.  H U N T E R ,  U.S.  B U R E A U  O F  R E C L A M A T I O N ,  
O P T I M I Z I N G  C L O U D  S E E D I N G  F O R  W A T E R  A N D  E N E R G Y  I N  C A L I F O R N I A  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  
a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.en e r g y.ca.go v / 2 0 0 7publi c a t i o n s / C E C - 5 0 0 - 2 0 0 7 - 0 0 8 / C E C -
5 0 0 - 2 0 0 7 - 0 0 8.PD F ;  R o s s  H o f f m a n ,  C o ntro l l i n g  H u r r i c a n e s ,  S C I . A M ., O c t. 2 0 0 4 ,  
a t  6 8. S e e  g e n e r a l l y  T r a c y  D. H e s t e r ,  R e m a k i n g  the W o r l d  to S a v e  It: A p p l y i n g  U . S .  
E n v i r o n m e ntal L a w  to C l i m ate E n g i n e e r i n g  P r o j e cts ,  3 8  E C O L O G Y  L.  Q.  8 5 1  
( 2 0 1 1 ).  
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That w eather - related dis as ters  continue to impose major los s es  is  a res ult 
of  of ten imprudent or s hor t s ighted human choices. 3  
Regulating  w eather ris k is  an increas ingly urgent  s ocial is s ue.  
There is  little doubt that the f requency and magnitude of  w eather - related 
dis as ters  are ris ing  over time. 4  Although the precise combination of  
caus es  may be debated — emis s ions  of  greenhous e gas es ? natural climatic 
cycles ? i ncreas ed concentration of  populations  in coas tal areas ? 5 — the 
trend is  undisputed . Hurricane K atrina in 2005 and H urricane  S andy in 
2012 brought unprecedented property damage to the G ulf  s tates  and to 
the coas tal northeas tern s tate s ; 6  and in 2013 Typhoon Haiyan,  w hich 
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B l o o m b e r g ,  J a n. 1 5 ,  2 0 1 3 ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.blo o m b e r g.co m / n e w s / 2 0 1 3 - 0 1 -
1 5 / u - s - c r op - in s u r a n c e - c l a i m s - r i s e - t o - r e c o r d - a f t e r - 2 0 1 2 - d r o u g h t - 2 - .htm l . 
5  F o r  a n  a r g u m e n t  t h a t ,  a l t h o u g h  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  i s  u n d e n i a b l y  o c c u r r i n g  a n d  i s  
a f f e c t e d  b y  h u m a n  i n f l u e n c e  ( m a i n l y  t h r o u g h  c a r b o n  e m i s s i o n s ) ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h ip 
be t w e e n  c l i m a t e  c h a n g e  a n d  s e v e r e  w e a t h e r  h a s  b e e n  o v e r s t a t e d ,  s e e  t h e  w o r k  o f  
P r o f e s s o r  R o g e r  P i e l k e  J r., s u m m a r i z e d  a n d  r e f e r e n c e d  i n  A n  O b a m a  A d v i s o r  I s  
Attack i n g  M e  f o r  T e stify i n g  that C l i m ate C h a n g e  H a s n ’t In c r e a s e d  E xtre m e  
W e athe r ,  T H E  N E W  R E P U B L I C  ( M a r. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.ne w r epubli c.co m / a r t i c l e / 1 1 6 8 8 7 / d o e s - c l i m a t e - c h a n g e - c a u s e - e x t r e m e -
w e a t h e r - i - s a i d - n o - a n d - w a s - a t t a c k e d .  F o r  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  o n e  c a u s e  i s  
i n c r e a s i n g  popula t i o n  d e n s i t y  a r o u n d  t h e  c o a s t s ,  s e e  s o u r c e s  c i t e d  i n f r a  n o t e  9 . 
6  C h r i s t opher  F. S c h u e t z e ,  2 0 1 2 :  T h e  Y e a r  o f  E xtre m e  W e athe r ,  N.Y.  T IM E S  I H T  
R E N D E Z V O U S  B L O G  ( J a n. 1 4 ,  2 0 1 3 ,  9 : 4 8  A M ) ,  
h t tp://r e n d e z v o u s.blo g s.ny t i m e s.co m / 2 0 1 3 / 0 1 / 1 4 / 2 0 1 2 - t h e - y e a r - o f - e x t r e m e -
w e a t h e r /. A c c o r d i n g  t o  N O A A ,  o w i n g  t o  H u r r i c a n e  S a n d y  ( $ 6 6  b i l l i o n )  a n d  t h e  
y e a r - l o n g  d r o u g h t  ( $ 3 0  b i l l i o n ) ,  2 0 1 2  w a s  a n  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  b a d  y e a r  f o r  w e a t h e r -
r e l a t e d  d i s a s t e r s  i n  t h e  U.S., t h o u g h  a r g u a b l y  n o t  t h e  w o r s t.  I n  2 0 1 2 ,  t h e r e  w e r e  
e l e v e n  w e a t h e r  a n d  c l i m a t e  d i s a s t e r  e v e n t s  i n  t h e  U.S. w i t h  l o s s e s  e x c e e d i n g  $ 1  
b i l l i o n. T h e s e  e l e v e n  e v e n t s  c u m u l a t i v e l y  c a u s e d  approx i m a t e l y  $ 1 1 6  b i l l i o n  i n  
d a m a g e s  a n d  1 1 3  d e a t h s ,  m a k i n g  2 0 1 2  t h e  s e c o n d  c o s t l i e s t  y e a r  s i n c e  1 9 8 0 ). I n  
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devas tated the P hilippines , eliminating entire villages  and killing 
thous ands , may have been the s tronges t tropical cyclone to hit land in 
recorded his tory. 7  Beyond anecdotes , the trend is  clear: w eather - dis as ter 
los s e s  are ris ing in the U.S . (Figure 1) 8  and w orldw ide (F igure  2).  
As t he magnitude and f requency of  w eather patterns  s eem to pose 
a ris k higher than ever , a large and grow ing f raction of  humanity’s  
physical as s ets  is located in harm’s  w ay. 9  Thus, the combination of  
s evere natural f orces  and increas ed human exposure pose one of  the 
maj or publ ic policy challenges  of  our era: how  to regulate behavior s o as  
to reduce  this  ris k.  
There are many w ays  that s ocieties  can reduce the ris k  of  
increas ingly large and potentially devas tating s torms. One approach is to 
addres s  the root caus e s  of  climate change.  Another approach is to  adopt 
rules and practices  that reduce the harm that unavoidable climatic 
patterns caus e . We ref er to this  latter  approach as the r egulation of 
weather risk . 
R egulation of  w eather ris k can take various  f orms . For example,  
to improve the durability of  cons truction under s evere w eather 
conditions , local governments  can adopt more demanding building codes  
and  s tricter s tandards  of  f loodplains management .  To  reduce exposure to 
w eather - caus ed harm , the government can  beef  up zoning regulations  or 
inves t  in community inf ras tructure , di vert ing  development away f rom 
high - ris k areas  or improv ing  f lood res is tance in developed areas . 
The f ocus  of  this  article is  on a dif f erent f orm of  regulation of  
s evere w eather  ris k : r egulation through ins ur ance . Insurance is  not 
commonly regarded  as a f orm of  command - and - control regulation. 
Rather, it is  w idely  recognized as  the primary tool to provide relief  af ter 
damaging w eather  events , s hif ting los s es  after they occur . But  ins urance 
is  als o an important — and in the w eather context,  a  potentially  crucial —
device in controlling and incentivizing behavior pr ior  to the occur r ence 
of los s es .   
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2 0 0 5 ,  t o t a l  d a m a g e s  e q u a l e d  $ 1 9 8  b i l l i o n. N A T ’ L  O C E A N I C  &  A T M O S P H E R I C  
A D M I N .,  B I L L I O N - D O L L A R  W E A T H E R / C L I M A T E  D I S A S T E R S  ( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.nc d c.no a a.go v / b i l l i o n s / s u m m a r y - s t a t s.  
7  T y p h o o n  H a i y a n :  W o r s e  T h a n  H e l l ,  T H E  E C O N O M I S T ,  N o v. 1 6 ,  2 0 1 3.  
8  S e e  s o u r c e s  c i t e d  s u p r a  n o t e  4 . 
9  N A T ’ L  O C E A N I C  &  A T M O S P H E R I C  A D M I N .,  N A T I O N A L  C O A S T A L  P O P U L A T I O N  
R E P O R T :  P O P U L A T I O N  T R E N D S  F R O M  1 9 7 0  T O  2 0 2 0  3  ( 2 0 1 3 )  ( s h o w i n g  t h e  h i g h e r  
r a t e  o f  popula t i o n  d e n s i t y  g r o w t h  i n  c o a s t a l  r e g i o n s  t h a n  n a t i o n a l  r a t e ) ;  B r e n d e n  
J o n g m a n  e t  a l., G l o b a l  E x p o s u r e  to R i v e r  a n d  C o a stal F l o o d i n g ,  2 2  G L O B A L  
E N V T L . C H A N G E  8 2 3 ,  8 2 9  ( 2 0 1 2 )  ( s h o w i n g  r e l a t i v e  c h a n g e s  i n  popula t i o n  e xpose d  
t o  c o a s t a l  f l o o d i n g  o v e r  c h a n g e s  i n  t o t a l  popula t i o n ,  1 9 7 0 – 2 0 1 0 ).  
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Buying  ins urance is  more than participating in a ris k - spreading 
pool , waiting f or the lightning to s trike . It is als o a trans action in w hich 
policyholders  are incentivized, in various  direct and indirect w ays  us ing 
contractual tools  that w e identif y , to adopt lo ss mitigation meas ures. 
Deploying their s uperior acces s  to ris k data and prediction methods ,  and 
pressured by competition to keep premiums af f ordable,  ins urers  prompt  
policyholders  to mitigate their exposure to harm. 10  An entire 
community’s  preparedness  f or  s evere w eather is  importantly s haped —
and potentially improved — by  the aggregation of  ins urance contracts  
held by the community’s  members.  
Looking at ins urance providers , private or government al ,  as 
r egulator s  of weather risk , t he  article as ks  tw o s ets  of  ques tions . First, 
h ow  does  w eather ins ura n ce  mitigate the expected cos ts  of  w eather -
related dis as ters ?  S econd,  d oes  the regulatory impact of ins urance 
change in s ys tematic w ays  w hen the government becomes  the provider 
of  w eather ins urance?  
In addres s ing t he f irs t ques tion , w e reconcile tw o  bas ic but  
conf licting ins ights . At one end s tands  the w idely accepted idea  that 
having ins urance dulls  the ins ured party’s incentive to mitigate los s es.  
This idea, commonly ref erred to as  “ moral hazard,” has  been w e l l -
s tudied in the literature on the economics  of  ins urance . T he theory of  
moral hazard s ugges t s  that ,  w hile  ins urance may be us ef ul and ef f icient 
as  a f orm of  post - disas ter relief , it des troys  the incentives  f or  pre - disas ter 
los s  mitigation .  
In opposition to  the moral hazard  conj ecture  s tands  a dif f erent 
prediction — not nearly as  w ell s tudied or w ell  unders tood — that 
ins urance contracts  reduce, rather than aggravate, ris k. Anticipating  that 
s torms  may be  coming  and recognizing that ins ured property owners  
might  capitulate to the  moral hazard,  ins urance providers  include in their 
contracts  powerful counter - incentives . These contractual mechanis ms  
prompt  policyholders  to improve their preparedness  and reduce the 
exposure of  their property to w eather - related los s es , potentially to a 
greater extent than they w ould have done in the abs ence of  ins urance .  
In addres s ing the f irs t ques tion — if  and how  ins urance mitigates  
the cos ts  of  w eather dis as ters — w e f ocus  on s everal  contractual tools  
ins urers  us e to improve policyhol ders ’  incentives , including incentives  to 
build s turdier homes. But our f ocus  is  ultimately on the mos t important 
aspect of w eather preparedness : how  ins urance a f f ect s  people’s  decis ions  
wher e  to  live.   
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10  S e e  O m r i  B e n - S h a h a r  &  K y l e  D. L o g u e ,  O utso u r c i n g  R e g u l atio n :  H o w  
I n s u r a n c e  R e d u c e s  M o r a l  H a z a r d ,  1 1 1  M I C H . L.  R E V . 1 9 7  ( 2 0 1 2 ).  
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Recognizing the w ays  in w hich ins urance can regulate w eather 
ris k, the article turns  to addres s  the s econd f undamental ques tion: w ho 
s hould provide the ins urance  and act as  the regulator of  w eather ris k —
private ins urance companies or the government? While in theory the 
ow ners hip and adminis tration  of  the ins urance mechanis m need not 
af f ect  the  optimal  content and des ign  of  ins urance contracts , w e s how  
that in practice it makes  a great dif f erence.  Unlike private ins urance, 
g overnment provision of  w eather ins urance  is less s ubj ect to market 
dis ciplin e  and to the s trict methods  of  actuarial  pricing, and is more 
likely to be inf luenced by political cons iderations ,  redis tributive 
preferences , and af f ordability  concerns . We identif y the primary f eatures  
of  government - provided  w eather  ins urance  and s how  th at it is priced 
dramatically dif f erently than private ins urance contracts , that it is  
purchased by dif f erent pools of  policyholders , that it create s  a dif f erent 
pattern of  w ithin - pool cros s  s ubs idies , and — mos t importantly — that it is  
responsible f or  dif f erent ex ante  mitigation and preparedness  incentives  
among homeow ners  and community developers . 
Th is  A rticle demons trates  that  regulation of  w eather ris k through  
government provided ins urance in the U.S. is of ten inf erior to regulation 
that might be i mplemented through private ins urance  markets . It is 
inf erior in tw o w ays. First, it is  les s  ef f icient. When people and f irms  are 
i ns ured by the government through contracts  that f ail to produce good 
incentives , they choos e property  locations  too clos e to paths that 
devas tating s torms  normally travel, and are thus  too vulnerable to harm . 
And when their homes  and bus ines s es  are in f act des troyed, they of ten 
rebuild in the s ame place — and in the s ame w ay — largely becaus e 
government ins urers  do not ins is t otherw i s e.  
Government ins urance can be inf erior in another w ay: it is  unf air. 
Almost all ins urance s chemes  create cros s - s ubs idies , w hereby s ome 
participants in the pool are over - charged and thus  s ubs idize others  w ho 
are undercharged. The unf airnes s  w e identif y has  to do w ith the troubling 
direction of  the cros s - s ubs idy that government - provided w eather 
ins urance in the U.S. creates : homeow ners  w ho enj oy the larges t 
ins urance cros s - s ubs id ies are thos e  w ho need them  least.  That is , the 
s ubs idy moves  f rom the poor t o the af f luent , rather than the revers e . The 
government , in other w ords ,  turns  out to be a regres s ive regulator of  
w eather  ris k . Using unique data f rom F lorida’s  s tate ins urance company, 
we es timate the magnitude of  the benef it that w ealthy homeow ners  
enj o y.  
Th is  A rticle is  s tructured as  f ollow s. The f irs t tw o S ections  are 
des criptive. Section I examines  the regulatory tools  that ins urers  have to 
improve the preparedness  of  their policyholders. Section II examines  the 
specific f eatures  of  government - provided ins urance, f ocus ing on three 
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programs th at are relevant to w eather ris k: post - disas ter relief , the 
N ational F lood Ins urance P rogram, and F lorida’s  s tate ow ned Citizens  
Ins urance that s ells  w ind ins urance policies. Section III then presents the 
normative claims  of  the article: G overnment ins uranc e creates  unf air 
pooling of  ris k and leads  to inef f icient preparedness.  
 
I.  REGULATION OF W EATHER RISK B Y  I NSURANCE  
 
Weather ris k — like any ris k — can be mitigated or prevented by 
enacting rules  that change people’s behavior prior to dis as ter . C ommon 
examples are the adoption of  building codes  and the us e of  zoning  
res trictions  at the local level . Building s tandards  reduce the vulnerability  
of  s tructures  to  s torms  and hars h conditions .  Z oning res trictions  s top 
people from moving into (or urge  them to move out of ) the predicted 
path  of f uture s torm s .  
Insurers , w hether public or private, do not us ually exercis e s uch 
direct  means  of  control over the decis ions  of  property owners  and 
developers . Instead, ins urance is  a contract  that , if  w e l l  draf ted ,  creates  
incentives  f or ins ureds  to engage in precautionary  behavior s  that cos t 
les s  than the ris k they  reduce . Insurance contracts  can operate as  ex  ante 
regulation, s etting guidelines  f or conduct  bef ore los s  occurs  and 
requiring adherence to thes e guidel ines  a s  a condition f or coverage or f or 
premium dis counts .11  Insurance contracts  can als o operate as  ex  post 
regulation, determining the  eligibility of  claims  and the magnitude of  
recovery af ter los s  occurs.  
Interes ted in the w ays  ins urers  regulate behavior ex ante to 
improve  storm  preparedness , w e examin e the  regulatory tools  at their 
disposal. In this  s ection ,  w e  lay out the conceptual framew ork of  
regulation by ins urance, but draw  no dis tinction betw een private and 
public  weather ins uranc e.  Later, in P art II,  w e provide a comparative 
ins titutional analys is  of  public and  private ins urance  s ys tems , examining 
how  each utilizes  thes e regulatory tools . 
A. The Price of Weather : Underwriting Differentiated 
Premiums  
P rice is  the ultimate regulator of  conduct. At the f ront end of  the 
ins urance trans action, ins urers ’ mos t bas ic tool f or creating incentives  to 
reduce ris k is  the s etting of  dif f erentiated premiums. Insurers  charge 
low er premiums to policyholders  w ho f ace low er expected harm, thus  
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11  S o m e  g o v e r n m e n t  prog r a m s  prov i d e  a  f o r m  o f  i n s u r a n c e  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  t h e  
s t a n d a r d  c o n t r a c t u a l  m o d e l  o f  i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e. E x a mples  o f  s u c h  “ s o c i a l  
i n s u r a n c e ”  i n c l u d e  M e d i c a r e ,  S o c i a l  S e c u r i t y ,  a n d  s t a t e  u n e mploy m e n t  i n s u r a n c e.  
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inducing people to behave in w ays  that qualif y f or the dis counts . Auto 
ins urers , f or example,  provide dis counts  f or driving s af er cars , driving 
les s  of ten, and driving accident - f ree. Life  ins urers  charge low er 
premiums f or not s mo king or s cuba diving . And property ins urers  
dis count thef t and f ire coverage if  policyholders  ins tall s ecurity s ys tems  
and s moke detectors.  
In many areas  of  ins ured activity, the as s es s ment of  expected 
harms — and w hether the inves tment in their reduction is  cos t - j us tif ied —
is  a complicated ,  data - driven enterprise. Sometimes  expected los s es  
depend on unobs ervable idios yncratic f actors  bes t know n by the 
policyholders , making it dif f icult f or ins urers  to price policies accurately ,  
w hich in turn gives  ris e to advers e s election. 12  But as ymmetric 
inf ormation  is  generally not a problem in regards  to w eather ins urance. 
On the contrary, p roperty i ns urers , both private and public ,  typically 
have much of  the  ris k - relevant inf ormation  on  w eather hazards , 
inf ormation f ar  s uperior to that w hich home ow ners  have .   
If ins urance premiums vary according to the ris k attributed to the 
specific property, the ins urance policy can become a powerful regulator 
of  behavior. Differentiated premium regulate behavior  not by mandating 
par ticular conduct  or s af ety meas ure  as , s ay, building codes  do. Rather, 
they regulate behavior by pricing dif f erent conduct choices , making  it 
more cos tly f or people to choos e high - ris k cours es  of  action. 
Policyholders  are f ree to decide w hether or not  to ins tall s torm w indow s  
or roof  anchors ; no ins urance broker  is  going to tell them that they mus t. 
But they are given an incentive to choos e s ome s af ety meas ures , becaus e 
they incur both the cos t of  ins tallation and — through the premium 
dis count — the benef it of  ris k - reduction.  
Differentiated ins urance premiums operate in much the s ame w ay 
as  government - s et P igouvian taxes. By taxing conduct that imposes 
external cos ts  and harm to others , the government f orces  actors  to take 
thos e cos ts  into account and eith er reduce their level of  activity or f ind 
w ays  to mitigate the harms. 13    
Thus , in contras t to traditional command - and - control rulemaking, 
w here the regulator has  to decide w hether to mandate  a particular s af ety 
meas ure or not (w hich in turn requires  the re gulator to compare the  total  
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12  S e e  G e o r g e s  D i o n n e  e t  a l., A d v e r s e  S e l e ctio n  i n  I n s u r a n c e  C o ntra ctin g ,  i n  
H A N D B O O K  O F  I N S U R A N C E  2 3 1  ( G e o r g e s  D i o n n e  e d .,  2 0 1 3 ) ;  A l m a  C o h e n  &  P e t e r  
S i e g e l m a n ,  T e stin g  f o r  A d v e r s e  S e l e ctio n  i n  I n s u r a n c e  M a r k ets ,  7 7  J.  R I S K  &  I N S . 
3 9  ( 2 0 1 0 ).  
13  S e e ,  e . g . ,  H A R V E Y  S.  R O S E N ,  P U B L I C  F I N A N C E  ( 1 0 t h  e d. 2 0 1 3 ).  F o r  f u r t h e r  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  h o w  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i n s u r a n c e  prem i u m s  r eplic a t e  t h e  P i g o u v i a n  t a x  
approa c h ,  s e e  B e n - S h a h a r  &  L o g u e ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 0 ,  a t  2 2 9 – 3 1.  
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benef it of  that s af ety meas ure w ith its  total cos t), ins urance regulation 
can avoid the  crude trade - of f  inherent in  binary choice  and market - w ide 
mandates .  That is , the  ins urance  regulator  needs  only to price the 
expected ris k  reduction as s ociated w ith each  s af ety inves tment  and let 
policyholders  s elf  s elect. Clients  f or w hom the premium reduction is  
more valuable than the neces s ary inves tment in the s af ety meas ure w ould 
make the inves tment ; others  w ould not. Zoning regulations , f or example, 
may require homes  to be built at particular elevation s ,  or may mandate 
the us e of  s tilts  or pilings to s urvive s torm s urges. Insurance regulation, 
by contras t, does  not mandate but provides a menu of  options — premium 
dis counts  to homes  that i nves t in dif f erent degrees  of  precautions. The 
sorting under this  menu approach avoids  the inef f iciency of  mandated, 
acros s - the - board, all - or - nothing s af ety requirements.   
Diff erentiated ris k - bas ed premiums can af f ect not only the level 
of  precautions , but  als o the level of  the ins ured’s  activity. This is  a 
general, trivial ef f ect of  prices: they s eparate people in to thos e w ho 
purchase and thos e w ho don’t. In the context of  w eather ins urance, this  
activity - calibrating ef f ect is  enormous ly important. A  crucial element  of  
humanity’s  preparedness  f or s evere w eather is  the determination  w here 
to live, and in particular ,  w here not  to live. If the cos t of  exposure to 
s evere w eather is  f ully captured by the ins urance rate, and thus  f ully 
borne by homeow ners , they w ould make optimal location decis ion s  
(prompted by their mortgage lenders  w ho require them to purchase f ull 
ins urance). The leis ure value of  oceanf ront living w ould be traded of f  
agains t the f ull cos t of  s uch living, w hich s hould include the f ull 
ins u rance cos t.  
Thus, dif f erentiated premiums are the primary tool available f or 
ins urers  to af f ect the ex  ante s af ety decis ions  of  their ins ureds. But to 
w ork ef f ectively, ins urers  mus t have the know - how  to adj us t premium s  
in accordance w ith f ine - tuned categ ories  of  ris k, and they mus t have the 
incentive to do s o accurately. We now  turn to examine thes e.  
 
B.  Pricing of Weather Insurance Policies  
Becaus e the primary ris k as s ociated w ith s evere w eather is  the 
ris k of  property damage, private w eather ris k ins uranc e is  s old mos tly 
though property ins urance policies, including homeow ners ’ and 
commercial property ins urance .  Homeow ners ’ policies, f or example, 
cover damage to the s tructure of  a home res ulting f rom all but a f ew  
excluded caus es.  Theref ore, w ith the exc eption of  f lood damage 
(dis cus s ed below ), mos t s torm - caus ed damage is  covered.  T he larges t 
s torm - related ris k ins ured by homeow ners ’  and commercial property 
policies is  the ris k of  w ind damage.  
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Wind ris k varies  enormous ly by location . As a res ult, the portion 
of  a property ins urance premium corresponding to the ris k of  w ind 
damage is  highly contingent on the location  of  the property . For 
example, the larges t homeow ners ’ ins urance  premium increas es  in recent 
years  have been in the s tate s  w ith the mos t damage f rom s torms , 
O klahoma (becaus e of  its  location in “ T ornado A lley” 1 4 ) and F lorida 
( hurricanes ). 15  I nsurers  are experts in s torm and  w ind patterns , in part 
becaus e of  the decades  of  inf ormation that have been gathered in the 
process of  u nderw riting w eather coverage and adj us ting w eather claims .  
In addition, ins urers  have come as  clos e to be ing  experts in predicting 
the f uture of  w eather ris ks  as  s cience w ill permit.  They are pioneers in 
their ef f orts  to us e mathematical modeling to take  into account not only 
w eather predictions  but als o demographic trends  and cons truction 
practices .16  For example, insurance models  may es timate that a home 
w ith a hip ped  roof  (pyramid s hape)  would s us tain  f our percent les s  
damage than a home w ith a roof  w it h gable ends. 17  Based on s uch 
estimates , p roperty ins urance prices are adj us ted each renew al period, 
us ually each year, to ref lect the lates t inf ormation regarding overall 
w eather - related ris ks.  According to one s ource, f or example, flood 
ins urance s old by private ins urers  depends on s o many ris k and 
mitigation f actors  that the rating s heet us ed by brokers  to determine 
premiums is  thirty  pages long. 18  
Weather ins urance premiums are als o individualized to particular 
property owners . Factors  that af f ect ins urance pricing include, as  
mentioned, location, but not only general region of  the country , f or 
example, the plains of  O klahoma as  compared to the hills  of  Tennes s ee .  
Also important is  the property’s  specific location  w ithin a give n region .  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14  “ T o r n a d o  A l l e y ”  i s  a  n i c k n a m e  g i v e n  t o  t h e  a r e a  i n  t h e  s o u t h e r n  plai n s  r e g i o n  o f  
t h e  U.S., i n c l u d i n g  n o r t h e r n  T e x a s ,  O k l a h o m a ,  K a n s a s ,  a n d  N e b r a s k a. T o r n a d o  
A l l e y ,  N A T ’ L  O C E A N I C  &  A T M O S P H E R I C  A D M I N .,  
h t tp://w w w.nc d c.no a a.go v / c l i m a t e - i n f o r m a t i o n / e x t r e m e - e v e n t s / u s - t o r n a d o -
c l i m a t o l o g y / t o r n a d o - a l l e y  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
15  T o p  5  States f o r  A uto, H o m e  I n s u r a n c e  R ate H i k e s  i n  2 0 1 3 :  P e r r & K n i g ht ,  
I N S U R A N C E  J O U R N A L  ( M a r. 1 2 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.in s u r a n c e j o u r n a l.co m / n e w s / n a t i o n a l / 2 0 1 4 / 0 3 / 1 2 / 3 2 3 0 4 3.htm.  
16  S e e  C a s s a n d r a  R. C o l e ,  D a v i d  A. M a cpher s o n  &  K a t h l e e n  A. M c C u l l o u g h ,  A  
C o m p a r i s o n  o f  H u r r i c a n e  L o s s  M o d e l s ,  3 3  J.  I N S . I S S U E S  3 1  ( 2 0 1 0 ) ;  A a r t i  D i n e s h ,  
H o w  C atastro p h e  E x p e rts M o d e l  H u r r i c a n e - I n d u c e d  Stor m  S u r g e ,  I N S U R A N C E  
J O U R N A L  ( J u l y  1 ,  2 0 1 3 ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.in s u r a n c e j o u r n a l.co m / m a g a z i n e s / f e a t u r e s / 2 0 1 3 / 0 7 / 0 1 / 2 9 6 7 8 7.htm . 
17  I d . ,  a t  3 8.  
18  U.S.  G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 1 3 - 5 6 8 ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E :  
I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  C H A N G I N G  C O V E R A G E  L I M I T S  A N D  E X P A N D I N G  C O V E R A G E  1 5  
( 2 0 1 3 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 6 6 0 / 6 5 5 7 1 9 .pdf [ h e r e i n a f t e r  G A O -
1 3 - 5 6 8 ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E ].  
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In addition , the price of  a homeow ners ’ policy on the coas ts  of  can be 
reduced dramatically if  the ins ured buys , builds , or renovates  a property  
according to particular cons truction specifications .19   There is  little doubt 
that property ins urance  location - bas ed pricing , by rais ing the cos t of  
ow ning or renting property on the s horeline,  has  af f ected the location 
decis ions , des ign choices , and cons truction methods  in s torm - prone 
areas.  
C. Developing and Implementing Weather Safety Tools  
P roperty ins urers  inves t cons iderable res ources  in res earching 
and developing techniques  f or minimizing the ris k of  w eather damage to 
homes  and bus ines s es.  Large ins urers  have their ow n development 
operations , and the indus try as  a w hole inves ts  collectiv ely through 
organizations  s uch as  the Ins urance Ins titute f or Bus ines s  and H ome 
S af ety (IBH S ). 20   Fas hioned af ter the model  of  the Ins urance Ins titute f or 
H ighw ay S af ety  (I H S ) , f amous  f or its  res earch into auto s af ety and 
especially its  cras h - tes ting and s a f ety rating of  new  automobiles , 2 1  the 
IBH S  res earches  how  bes t to cons truct buildings  to minimize various  
types of damage, especial ly damage f rom s evere w eather.   
One in novative res earch technique at IBH S , as  yet unmatched by 
government regulators , is  the high w ind tes t f acility at the IBH S  
Res earch Center in S outh Carolina.  At this  Center, IBH S  is  able to 
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19  F o r  e x a mple, a t  l e a s t  f o u r  s t a t e s  perm i t  property  i n s u r e r s  t o  d i s c o u n t  prem i u m s  i f  
t h e  i n s u r e d  property  i s  c e r t i f i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  s t a n d a r d s  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  i n s u r a n c e  
i n d u s t r y ’ s  r e s e a r c h  c e n t e r ,  t h e  I n s u r a n c e  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  B u s i n e s s  a n d  H o m e  S a f e t y. 
F O R T I F I E D  H o m e ™ :  H u r r i c a n  F i n a n c i a l  I n c e ntiv e s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  
B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,  h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp -
co n t e n t / uploa d s / F O R T I F I E D - H o m e - I n c e n t i v e s _ I B H S.pdf  ( l i s t i n g  A l a b a m a ,  
G e o r g i a ,  M i s s i s s ippi, a n d  N o r t h  C a r o l i n a  a s  s t a t e s  a l l o w i n g  o r  r e q u i r i n g  i n c e n t i v e  
prog r a m s  b y  i n s u r e r s  b a s e d  o n  I B H S  c e r t i f i c a t i o n ) ;  s e e  a l s o  F O R T I F I E D  O v e r v i e w ,  
I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y  
h t tps:// w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / f o r t i f i e d - m a i n /  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  
( e xplain i n g  t h e  I B H S  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  proc e s s ). I n  a d d i t i o n ,  F l o r i d a  r e q u i r e s  i n s u r e r s  t o  
prov i d e  w i n d  m i t i g a t i o n  d i s c o u n t s ,  up to  8 3 %  o f  prem i u m s ,  b a s e d  o n  a  v e r y  
d e t a i l e d  s e t  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c r i t e r i a. S e e ,  e . g . ,  N otic e  o f  P r e m i u m  D i s c o u nts f o r  
H u r r i c a n e  L o s s ,  F L O R I D A  O F F I C E  O F  I N S U R A N C E  
R E G U L A T I O N ,  h t tp://w w w.flo i r.co m / s i t e d o c u m e n t s / o i r - b 1 - 1 6 5 5.pdf  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  
D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( e xplain i n g  t o  F l o r i d a  i n s u r a n c e  purc h a s e r s  h o w  w i n d  m i t i g a t i o n  
prem i u m  d i s c o u n t s  a r e  c a l c u l a t e d ) ;  W i n d storm  L o s s  R e d u ctio n  C r e d its ,  F L O R I D A  
O F F I C E  O F  I N S U R A N C E  R E G U L A T I O N ,  h t tp://w w w.flo i r.co m / s i t e D o c u m e n t s / O I R -
B 1 - 1 6 9 9.xls  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( sprea d s h e e t  s h o w i n g  a c t u a l  c r e d i t  a m o u n t  
f o r  e a c h  specif i c  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c r i t e r i o n.)  
20  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,  
h t tps:// w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
21  S a f ety R atin g s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  H I G H W A Y  S A F E T Y ,  
h t tp://w w w.iih s.org / i i h s / r a t i n g s  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
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generate realis tic w ind hazards , including w inds  up to 130 mph. 22  This 
f acility has  permitted IBH S  to s tudy a range of  alternative cons truction 
methods  to determine w hich methods  bes t w iths tand high w inds.  As a 
res ult of  this  tes ting technology, IBH S  has  developed a program of  
cons truction certif ication that grades  s tr uctures  according to their ability 
to res is t high w inds , w ith certif ications  f rom bronze, to s ilver, to gold. 23   
The ratings  are us ed in a number of  s tates , w here ins urance regulators  
either permit or require  ins urers  to calculate premium dis counts  on the 
b as is  of  s uch  ratings .24  
Insurers , it turns  out, have a f inancial  s take not only in 
identif ying ef f ective cons truction innovations , but als o in s eeing thos e 
innovations  implemented by policyholders.  It is  only w hen new  and 
improved ris k reduction cons tructi on methods  are actually us ed that 
w eather - related ins urance claims  are reduced , thereby enabling  ins urers  
to compete more robus tly f or bus ines s  w ith low er premiums.  To 
encourage adoption  among policyholders , ins urers  as  mentioned  us e 
premium dis counts.  A nd to encourage adoption by policymakers , 
ins urers  rate the dif f erent localities ’ home - building s tandards.  To 
accomplish this ,  I BH S  collects  inf ormation regarding the building codes  
in dif f erent communities  and how  w ell thos e codes  are being enf orced  by 
local governments.  This inf ormation is  then us ed to generate building 
code  ef f ectivenes s  ratings , w hich individual ins urers  may then us e to 
price their coverage  w ithin the rated dis tricts .25  The indirect ef f ect of  
thes e ratings  is  to put pressure on s ta te and local governments  to tighten 
their building codes  and their enf orcement of  thes e building codes.  
It is  important to note that the building code ef f ectivenes s  rating 
is  done in coordination w ith indus try - ow ned Ins urance S ervices  O f f ice 
(IS O ) 2 6 — the bu reau  that collects  data and s hares  it w ithin the indus try to 
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22 R e s e a r c h  C e nter ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,   
h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp - co n t e n t / uploa d s / R S C _ o v e r v i e w _ I B H S.pdf.  
23  I B H S  F o rtifi e d  H o m e  H u r r i c a n e  P r o g r a m :  B r o n z e ,  S i l v e r  a n d  G o l d :  A n  
I n c r e m e ntal,  H o l i stic  A p p r o a c h  to R e d u c i n g  R e s i d e ntia l  P r o p e rty L o s s e s  i n  
H u r r i c a n e - P r o n e  A r e a s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y ,  
a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp - co n t e n t / uploa d s / A T C -
F O R T I F I E D _ I B H S.pdf ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  D e c. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
24  S e e  s o u r c e s  c i t e d  s u p r a  n o t e  1 9 . 
25  S e e  R atin g  the  States:  A n  A s s e s s m e nt o f  R e s i d e ntia l  B u i l d i n g  C o d e  a n d  
E n f o r c e m e nt S y stem s  f o r  L i f e  S a f ety a n d  P r o p e rty P r otectio n  i n  H u r r i c a n e - P r o n e  
R e g i o n s ,  I N S U R A N C E  I N S T I T U T E  F O R  B U S I N E S S  &  H O M E  S A F E T Y  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.dis a s t e r s a f e t y.or g / wp - co n t e n t / uploa d s / i b h s - r a t i n g - t h e - s t a t e s.pdf  
26  T h e  I S O ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  f u n c t i o n s ,  a s s e s s e s  t h e  b u i l d i n g  c o d e s  i n  e f f e c t  i n  a  
parti c u l a r  c o m m u n i t y  a n d  h o w  t h e  c o m m u n i t y  e n f o r c e s  i t s  b u i l d i n g  c o d e s ,  w i t h  
specia l  e mphas i s  o n  m i t i g a t i o n  o f  l o s s e s  f r o m  n a t u r a l  h a z a r d s.  B u i l d i n g  C o d e  
E f f e ctiv e n e s s  G r a d i n g  S c h e d u l e  ( B C E G S ® ) ,  I S O M I T I G A T I O N .CO M ,  
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as s is t in the pricing of  policies.  Through this  process , building code 
enf orcement and ins urance policy pricing are coordinated acros s  the 
entire indus try and linked to the bes t available inf orma tion regarding los s  
prevention. 27  For example, in rating local building codes , the IS O - I BH S  
methodology collects  data on the type of foundation the j uris diction 
mandates  f or building in the f loodplain, how  it addres s es  post - disas ter 
recons truction permits, the f unding it allocates  to building code 
enf orcement,  how  it trains  its  inspectors, and the s tandards  it us es  to 
review  des ign of  new  cons truction. 28  
In s um, the bus ines s  of  ins urance is  as  much about ris k 
management as  it is  about pooling of  ris k. The des ign of  ins urance pools 
requires  accurate ris k rating and pricing, prompting ins urers  to make 
their products s ens itive to the various  mitigation ef f orts  and activity 
choices  of  their clients. The combination of  acces s  to inf ormation and 
competitive pressures  to of f er af f ordable premiums generate a 
f ramew ork in w hich ins urers  act as  private regulators  of  w eather ris k.  
 
II. G OVERNMENT -PROVIDED W EATHER INSURANCE  
  
The previous part examined the tools  that providers  of  ins urance 
contracts  us e to regulate behavior  bef ore w eather dis as ter s  s trike , w ith 
the primary tool being ins urers ’ ability to rate ris ks — to charge relatively 
high premiums f or properties located in high - ris k areas  or properties that 
lack  s t a t e - of - the - art w eather mitigation f eatures.   In this  part we f ocus  in 
particular on government - provided w eather ris k ins urance, des cribing 
three exis ting ins titutions : f ederal dis as ter relief , the N ational F lood 
Ins urance P rogram, and F lorida’s  Citizens  P roperty Ins urance 
Corporation.    
Why, you might w onder, is  the government involved  in w eather 
ins urance in the f irs t place?  Why not leave all w eather ris k ins urance to 
the private market?  There are s everal rationales  commonly of f ered to 
j us tif y governments  acting as  ins urers  of  w eather ris k .   
F irs t, it is  s ometimes  argued that truly catas trophic weather 
events  are s uf f iciently rare that property owners  s ys tematicall y 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
h t tp://w w w.is o m i t i g a t i o n.co m / b c e g s / 0 0 0 0 / b c e g s 0 0 0 1.htm l  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 4 ,  
2 0 1 4 ).  
27  S e e  i d . 
28  S e e  B u i l d i n g  C o d e  E f f e ctiv e n e s s  G r a d i n g  S c h e d u l e  ( B C E G S ® )  Q u e stio n n a i r e  
( I S O  P r operti e s ,  I n c. 2 0 0 4 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.is r b.co m /pubs / B C E G S % 2 0 Q u e s t i o n n a i r e.pdf . 
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underes timate the ris k. 29   According to this  behavioral  account , 
purchasers  of  w eather ins urance do not f ully appreciate the ris k of  s evere 
w eather  and are theref or e  un w illing to pay actuarially f air premiums that 
ins urers ’ require to provide coverage . In deed, only 20  percent  of  all U.S. 
homes are covered by f lood ins urance , despite the f act that f loods  can 
caus e los s es  that hous ehold w ould be unable to recover f rom abs ent 
ins urance .30    
Second,  the problem may lie not w ith the demand  f or , but rather 
w ith the s upply of f lood coverage. I t is s ometimes  argued that w eather 
calamities  are s imply too large — or correlated — to be ins ured through 
private markets.  Insurers  may  not w ant to be in the market f or s evere 
w eather ins urance  becaus e they cannot abs orb the ri s k through their 
conventional pooling methods .   
Third,  government provision of  w eather ins urance may be 
neces s ary f or af f ordability  (redis tributive)  reas ons. Even if  policyholders  
w ere s eeking  to purchase  and ins urers  w ere w illing to provide actuarially 
priced weather dis as ter ins urance, many policyholders  s imply could not 
af f ord s uch coverage, especially in areas  w here the ris k is  large and thus  
cos tly to ins ure. 31   
Thes e rationales  purport to  provide the theoretical bas is  f or 
government - provided w eather - r is k ins urance.  What f orm the 
government - provided ins urance s hould take is  a s eparate ques tion.  In 
the remainder of  this  P art, w e dis cus s  s everal dif f erent models  of  
government - provided w eather ins urance.  In the f irs t — direct government 
relief  f or dis as ter los s es — there is  no contractual element.  In the other 
two  programs  (f lood and w ind ins urance), the government  acts  like an 
ins urance company: iss uing (or s ubs idizing the is s uan ce of ) actual 
ins urance contracts , charging premiums, and paying coverage only to its  
premium - paying clients . As we dis cus s  thes e exis ting arrangements , w e 
continue to revis it the underlying rationales  f or government intervention 
and examine their validity . 
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29  S e e  J o s h u a  A a r o n  R a n d l e t t ,  C o m m e n t ,  F a i r  A c c e s s  to I n s u r a n c e  R e q u i r e m e nts ,  
1 5  O C E A N  &  C O A S T A L  L.J . 1 2 7  ( 2 0 1 0 )  ( d e s c r i b i n g  priv a t e  i n s u r e r s ’  w i t h d r a w a l  
f r o m  c o a s t a l  M a s s a c h u s e t t s  m a r k e t s ,  l e a v i n g  r e s i d e n t s  w i t h  o n l y  a  s t a t e  a g e n c y  
f r o m  w h i c h  t o  purc h a s e  property  i n s u r a n c e ) ;  M i c h a e l  A. B r o w n ,  N o t e ,  A n ythin g  
b ut a  B r e e z e :  M o v i n g  F o r w a r d  W itho ut N F I P  P r o g r a m ,  3 7  B.C.  E N V T L . A F F . L.  
R E V . 3 6 5  ( 2 0 1 0 ) ;  s e e  a l s o  H O W A R D  C.  K U N R E U T H E R  E T  A L .,  I N S U R A N C E  &  
B E H A V I O R A L  E C O N O M I C S  1 1 3 – 1 6  ( 2 0 1 3 )  ( d e s c r i b i n g  t h e  d e m a n d  a n o m a l y  o f  
f a i l u r e  t o  prote c t  a g a i n s t  l o w - prob a b i l i t y ,  h i g h - c o n s e q u e n c e  e v e n t s ) ;  c f .  M u n i c h  R e ,  
N atura l  C atastro p h e s  2 0 1 0 :  A n a l y s e s ,  A s s e s s m e nts, P o s itio n s ,  T O P I C S  G E O ,  F e b. 
2 0 1 1 ,  a t  6  ( d e s c r i b i n g  h o w  v o l c a n i c  e r uptio n s  a r e  “ a n  u n d e r e s t i m a t e d  r i s k ” ).  
30  S e e  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e ,  h t tp://e n.w ik ipedia.org / w i k i / F l o o d _ i n s u r a n c e.  
31  S e e  R i c h a r d  A. D e r r i g  e t. a l ,  C atastr o p h e  M a n a g e m e nt in  a  C h a n g i n g  W o r l d ,  1 1  
R I S K  M A N A G E M E N T  &  I N S . R E V . 2 6 9 ,  2 7 2  ( 2 0 0 8 ).  
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A. Government Disaster Relief  
The broades t f orm of  f ederally provided w eather  ris k ins urance is  
dis as ter relief. Federal d is as ter relief  provides benef its  to all parties w ho 
s uf f er qualif ying los s es , up to statutory or regulatory limits , w ith no 
requirement of  buying ins urance or paying premiums .  The F ederal 
Emergency M anagement A gency (F EM A ) operates the  D is as ter Relief  
F und 3 2  to rebuild inf ras tructure and to provide relief  to individuals  and 
private bus ines s es. Becaus e the D is as ter Rel ief  F und does  not collect 
ins urance premiums in advance, it operates as  a f orm of  s ocial ins urance, 
w hereby relief  payments are  f unded by tax revenues .33   
The F und  provides grants  to individuals  and hous eholds  of  up to 
$3 0,0 00 to cover unins ured los s es  res ulting f rom any s ingle emergency 
that is  declared a dis as ter by the P res ident . 3 4  As los s es  of ten f ar exceed 
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32  S e e  D i s a ster  R e l i e f  F u n d :  M o nthly  R e p o rt ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y , 
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / d i s a s t e r - r e l i e f - f u n d  ( l a s t  update d  D e c. 9 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ;  P u b l i c  
A s s i stan c e :  L o c a l ,  State, T r i b a l ,  a n d  N o n - P r o f it ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . 
A G E N C Y ,  h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v /publi c - a s s i s t a n c e - l o c a l - s t a t e - t r i b a l - a n d - n o n - prof i t  
( l a s t  update d  J u l y  2 4 ,  2 0 1 4 ) . T h e  f e d e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  c o v e r s  o n l y  7 5  perc e n t  o f  
d i s a s t e r - r e l a t e d  e xpens e s ,  w h i l e  s t a t e s  h a v e  t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  2 5  perc e n t. 
S e e  4 2  U.S.C. §  5 1 7 4 ( g )  ( 2 0 1 3 ). S t a t e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  c a n  petit i o n  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
f e d e r a l  s h a r e  a s  h i g h  a s  1 0 0  perc e n t.  
33  T h e  D i s a s t e r  R e l i e f  F u n d  w a s  c r e a t e d  b y  t h e  R o b e r t  T. S t a f f o r d  D i s a s t e r  R e l i e f  
a n d  E m e r g e n c y  A s s i s t a n c e  A c t ,  4 2  U.S.C § §  5 1 2 1 – 5 2 0 8  ( 2 0 1 3 ).  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
S t a f f o r d  A c t ,  e a c h  s t a t e ,  t h r o u g h  i t s  g o v e r n o r ,  m u s t  r e q u e s t  a s s i s t a n c e  f r o m  t h e  
P r e s i d e n t. I d .  a t  §  5 1 7 0. A s  part o f  t h i s  r e q u e s t ,  t h e  s t a t e  m u s t  a s s e r t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  
h a s  a n  e m e r g e n c y  plan  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  i mplem e n t e d ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e ’ s  plan  i s  n o t  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m e e t  t h e  n e e d  r e s u l t i n g  f r o m  t h e  d i s a s t e r .    
34  S e e  g e n e r a l l y  D i s a ster  L o a n  P r o g r a m ,  U.S.  S M A L L  B U S I N E S S  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N ,  
h t tp://w w w.sb a.go v / c o n t e n t / d i s a s t e r - l o a n - prog r a m  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 ) .  
F e d e r a l  d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s  o c c u r  w i t h  s o m e  f r e q u e n c y.  B e t w e e n  2 0 0 4  a n d  2 0 1 1 ,  
t h e  P r e s i d e n t  r e c e i v e d  s t a t e  r e q u e s t s  f o r  6 2 9  d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  o f  w h i c h  5 3 9  ( o r  
8 6  perc e n t )  w e r e  approv e d.  B e c a u s e  P r e s i d e n t i a l  d i s a s t e r  d e c l a r a t i o n s  a r e  m a d e  
o n e  s t a t e  a t  a  t i m e ,  m a n y  o f  d e c l a r a t i o n s  a r e  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  s i n g l e  s t o r m s  t h a t  
a f f e c t e d  m u l t iple s t a t e s.  F o r  e x a mple, o f  t h e  5 3 9  d e c l a r a t i o n s  i s s u e d ,  r o u g h l y  h a l f  
o f  t h e  F E M A  payo u t s  ( $ 4 0  b i l l i o n  o f  t h e  t o t a l  $ 8 0  b i l l i o n )  w e r e  f o r  K a t r i n a - r e l a t e d  
l o s s e s  a l o n e. U .S.  G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 1 2 - 8 3 8 ,  F E D E R A L  
D I S A S T E R  A S S I S T A N C E :  I M P R O V E D  C R I T E R I A  N E E D E D  T O  A S S E S S  A  J U R I S D I C T I O N ’ S  
C A P A B I L I T Y  T O  R E S P O N D  A N D  R E C O V E R  O N  I T S  O W N  1 4  ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at 
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 6 5 0 / 6 4 8 1 6 2.pdf. F o r  H u r r i c a n e  S a n d y ,  F E M A  payo u t s  
o n e  y e a r  a f t e r  t h e  e v e n t  t o t a l e d  m o r e  t h a n  $ 1.4 b i l l i o n  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  a s s i s t a n c e  a n d  
$ 2.4 b i l l i o n  i n  S B A  l o a n s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  $ 7.9 b i l l i o n  i n  N F I P  payo u t s  t o  f l o o d  polic y  
h o l d e r s  a n d  $ 3.2 b i l l i o n  t o  f u n d  e m e r g e n c y  w o r k ,  d e b r i s  r e m o v a l ,  a n d  r epa ir  a n d  
r eplac e m e n t  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e. S e e  H u r r i c a n e  S a n d y :  T i m e l i n e ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  
M G M T . A G E N C Y ,  h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / h u r r i c a n e - s a n d y - t i m e l i n e  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 
5 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
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thes e grants , the F und als o provides loans — up to $200,000 f or 
hous eholds  and $2 million f or bus ines s es — t o cover the uni ns ured cos ts  
of  repair ing  or replac ing  damaged property .35   
Another f orm  of  dis as ter relief  comes  f rom charitable 
contributions  to aid dis as ter victims.  These originate  f rom private 
donors  and not  f rom the government , but they are heavily s ubs idized by 
f ederal tax policy — mos t notably  the charitable contribution deduction .  
Not s urprising ly ,  the magnitude of  charitable dis as ter aid is  larges t 
s hortly af ter the occurrence of  highly unus ual catas trophes that elicit 
public sympathy . Examples of post - disas ter  spike s  in charitable 
contributions  include maj or earthquakes  and ts unamis , 3 6  as well as 
devas tating s torms  s uch as  K atrina and the J oplin, Mis s ouri and 
Tus caloos a, A labama t ornadoes. 37  However, a lthough charitable dis as ter 
relief  can grow  very large, it ten ds  to be (perhaps always  is ) dw arf ed by 
government relief  as  w ell as  by private ins urance payouts. 38    
T he U.S. government has  attempted to increas e the role of  
charitable dis as ter relief  by introducing new  tax s ubs idies.  Contributions  
to dis as ter victims  through qualif ied charities  have alw ays  been tax 
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35  4 2  U.S.C. §  5 1 7 4 ( h )  ( 2 0 1 3 )  ( s e t t i n g  m a x i m u m  d i s a s t e r  r e l i e f  a w a r d  a t  $ 2 5 , 0 0 0  
per d i s a s t e r ,  a d j u s t e d  a n n u a l l y  f o r  i n f l a t i o n ). I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r epair s  a n d  
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  F E M A  w i l l  c o v e r  t e mpora r y  h o u s i n g  a s  w e l l  a s ,  d i s a s t e r - r e l a t e d  
m e d i c a l ,  c l o t h i n g ,  f u e l ,  m o v i n g  a n d  s t o r a g e ,  a n d  e v e n  b u r i a l  e xpens e s. D i s a ster  
A s s i stan c e  A v a i l a b l e  f r o m  F E M A ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y ,   
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / d i s a s t e r - a s s i s t a n c e - a v a i l a b l e - f e m a  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
36  S e e  M O L L Y  F.  S H E R L O C K ,  C O N G . R E S E A R C H  S E R V .,  R 4 1 0 3 6 ,  C H A R I T A B L E  
C O N T R I B U T I O N S  F O R  H A I T I ’ S  E A R T H Q U A K E  V I C T I M S  ( 2 0 1 0 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp: //f a s.or g / s gp/cr s / m i s c / R 4 1 0 3 6.pdf; D a n s h e r a  C o r d s ,  C h a r itab l e  C o ntrib utio n s  
f o r  D i s a ster  R e l i e f ,  5 7  C A T H . U.  L.  R E V . 4 2 7 ,  4 4 7 – 5 0  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ;  B r i t t  R e i e r s g o r d ,  
T e c h n o l o g y  a n d  D i s a ster :  T h e  C a s e  o f  H a iti a n d  the  R i s e  o f  T e xt M e s s a g e  R e l i e f  
D o n atio n s  ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  D e n v e r  C a s e - Specif i c  B r i e f i n g  P aper, 2 0 1 1 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at   
h t tps:// w w w.du.ed u / k o r b e l / c r i i c / h u m a n i t a r i a n b r i e f s / b r i t t r e i e r s g o r d.pdf.  
37  S e e  D a n i e l  J. S m i t h  &  D a n i e l  S u t t e r ,  R e s p o n s e  a n d  R e c o v e r y  A fter the  J o p l i n  
T o r n a d o ,  1 8  I N D E P . R E V . 1 6 5  ( 2 0 1 3 ).  
38  F o r  e x a mple, h u r r i c a n e  K a t r i n a ,  w h i c h  w a s  t h e  m o s t  e xpens i v e  d i s a s t e r  i n  U.S. 
h i s t o r y ,  l e d  t o  c h a r i t a b l e  r e l i e f  o f  r o u g h l y  $ 2.5 b i l l i o n. U.S. G O V ’ T  
A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 0 6 - 2 9 7 T ,  H U R R I C A N E S  K A T R I N A  A N D  R I T A :  
P R O V I S I O N  O F  C H A R I T A B L E  A S S I S T A N C E  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / n e w.ite m s / d 0 6 2 9 7 t.pdf . T h e  f e d e r a l  d i s a s t e r  r e l i e f ,  b y  
c o mparis o n ,  f o r  t h e  2 0 0 5  h u r r i c a n e  s e a s o n ,  e x c e e d e d  $ 1 0 0  b i l l i o n. M A T T  
F E L L O W E S  &  A M Y  L I U ,  B R O O K I N G S  I N S T I T U T I O N ,  F E D E R A L  A L L O C A T I O N S  I N  
R E S P O N S E  T O  K A T R I N A ,  R I T A  A N D  W I L M A :  A N  U P D A T E  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.br o o k i n g s.ed u / ~ / m e d i a / r e s e a r c h / f i l e s / r eports / 2 0 0 6 / 8 / m e t r opolit a npolic
y % 2 0 f e l l o w e s / 2 0 0 6 0 7 1 2 _ k a t r i n a f a c t s h e e t.pdf . B y  f u r t h e r  c o mparis o n ,  priv a t e  
i n s u r a n c e  c o v e r a g e  f o r  K a t r i n a  t o t a l e d  $ 4 1.1 b i l l i o n. R o b e r t  P. H a r t w i g  &  C l a i r e  
W i l k i n s o n ,  H u r r i c a n e  K atrin a :  T h e  F i v e  Y e a r  A n n i v e r s a r y  2  ( I n s. In f o. In s t. 2 0 1 0 ) ,  
a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.iii.org / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / 1 0 0 7 K a t r i n a 5 A n n i v e r s a r y.pdf.  
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deductible, in the s ame w ay that all charitable contributions  are tax 
deductible w ithin limits.  More recently, how ever, legis lation has  been 
enacted specifically to increas e the tax s ubs idy f or dis as ter - rel ated 
giving. 39   Under thes e new  law s , f or example, whereas  charitable 
contribution  deduction s  are generally capped at 50  percent  of  adj us ted 
gros s  income f or individuals , there is  no s uch limitation f or contributions  
to dis as ter relief.  
 
B. Government -Provided Contractual Insurance   
The government is  als o in the bus ines s  of  s elling w eather - ris k 
ins urance, f illing in f or a real or perceived gap in the s upply of private 
ins urance. Unlike f reely provided dis as ter relief , government - s old 
ins urance contracts  need not burden taxpayers. Indeed the presence of  
w idespread ins urance coverage can reduce  budget s tres s  on ex  post relief  
f unds .  We f ocus  the dis cus s ion below  on tw o specific government 
ins urance programs: the F ederal f lood ins urance and the F lorid a  w i n d 
ins urance plans.  
1 . T he National Flood Ins ur ance Pr ogr am  
P rior to the adoption of  f ederally provided f lood policies , f lood 
ris ks  w ere covered through private ins urance contracts  s old by 
commercial ins urance companies.  But they w ere not part of the bas ic  
homeow ners  ins urance policy; ins tead, they had to be purchased as  an 
added coverage, priced separately. Becaus e, as  w e explained above,  
many property owners  opted not to purchase  the f lood  coverage, the 
f ederal government dis as ter relief  f und w as  called u pon for f lood relief  
w hen the big f loods  eventually hit.  T he N ational F lood Ins urance 
P rogram ( N F IP )  w as  created  to provide relief  f rom f lood los s es  in a w ay 
that minimized the f inancial burden on f ederal taxpayers.    
Through the N F IP , the f ederal governm ent s ells  f lood ins urance 
policies to res idential and commercial property .  Although N F IP  policies 
are marketed largely, though not entirely, through private ins urance 
companies, they are f ully underw ritten by the f ederal government. 40  
Unlike private ins urance policies generally, w hich provide varying levels  
of  coverage amounts  depending on ris k and demand, coverage under 
N F IP  f lood policies is  s tatutorily capped at $350,000 f or homeow ners  
($250,000 f or the res idence its elf  and another $100,000 f or contents ) and 
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39  K a t r i n a  E m e r g e n c y  T a x  R e l i e f  A c t  o f  2 0 0 5 ,  P u b. L. N o. 1 0 9 -  
7 3 ,  1 1 9  S t a t. 2 0 1 6 ;  G u l f  Opportu n i t y  Z o n e  A c t  o f  2 0 0 5 ,  P u b. L. N o. 1 0 9 -  1 3 5 ,  1 1 9  
S t a t. 2 5 7 7.  
40  G A O ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 8 ,  a t  4. T h e r e  i s  a  s m a l l  priv a t e  i n s u r a n c e  
m a r k e t  t h a t  prov i d e s  c o v e r a g e  f o r  h o m e  v a l u e s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  t h e  c e i l i n g  u n d e r  t h e  
N F I P. I d .  
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$1 million f or commercial property owners  ($500,000 each f or buildings  
and contents ). 41    
Als o unlike private property ins urance markets , w here rates  are 
s et primarily by market f orces , w ith N F IP  f lood policies F E M A  s ets  and 
adj us ts  the rates .  If the premiums collected in a given year exceed the 
amount needed to cover f lood claims , the exces s  is  passed on to the 
Treas ury D epartment. Otherw is e, if  the amount of  los s  claims  exceeds  
premiums collected, the N F IP  has  the authority to ( and does ) borrow  
f rom the Treas ury to cover claims. In such cas e s , the N F IP  is  obligated 
to pay back over time, perhaps by rais ing rates.  As a res ult, the U.S. 
taxpayer is currently the reins urer of  truly catas trophic flood ris ks.  NFIP 
policies w ere, and s till are , underpriced in c omparison w ith the actual 
ris ks.   Becaus e of  this  f act  (about w hich w e w ill have more to s ay 
below ) , N F IP  policies  have come to dominate the f lood ris k market. 42    
In addition  to providing af f ordable f lood coverage , the N F IP  
s eeks  to incentivize f lood mitigation. To participate in the program and 
to entitle their res ident s  to buy s ubs idized N F IP  policies, communities  
are required adopt and enf orce a f loodplain management ordinance to 
reduce f uture f lood ris ks  to new  cons truction. In thes e areas , new  
cons truction and s ubs tantial improvements  mus t conf orm to N F IP ’s  
building s tandards. For example, the low es t f loor of  a s tructure mus t  be 
elevated to or above the “ bas e f lood elevation ” —  the level at w hich 
there is  a 1 percent chance of  f looding in a given year.  
To further mitigate the problem of  f lood ins urance coverage gaps, 
Congres s  decided to make the purch ase of  N F IP  policies manda tory  f or 
properties that are in certain f lood zones  and that are s ubj ect to  f ederally 
regulated mortgages. 43  Such mandatory f lood ins urance is  intended to 
protect the value of  the collateral that home lenders  and guarantors  rely 
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41  I d . at 9.  
42  A c c o r d i n g  t o  a  R A N D  s t u d y  publi s h e d  i n  2 0 0 6 ,  a l m o s t  a l l  o f  t h e  f l o o d  polic i e s  
o n  s i n g l e  f a m i l y  h o m e s  ( S F H s )  i n  specia l  f l o o d  h a z a r d  a r e a s  ( S F H A s )  w e r e  N F I P  
polic i e s.  Specif i c a l l y ,  t h e  s t u d y  f o u n d  t h a t  4 9  perc e n t  o f  a l l  S F H s  i n  S F H A s  h a d  
N F I P  polic i e s  a n d  a n o t h e r  1  t o  3  perc e n t  h a d  priv a t e  polic i e s.  L L O Y D  D I X O N ,  
N O R E E N  C L A N C Y ,  S E T H  A.  S E A B U R Y  &  A D R I A N  O V E R T O N ,  R A N D ,  T H E  
N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M ’ S  M A R K E T  P E N E T R A T I O N  R A T E :  
E S T I M A T E S  A N D  P O L I C Y  I M P L I C A T I O N S  ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ra n d.org / c o n t e n t / d a m / r a n d /pubs / t e c h n i c a l _ r eports / 2 0 0 6 / R A N D _ T R 3 0 0
.su m.pdf. T h e  prim a r y  e x c eptio n  i s  f l o o d  r i s k  polic i e s  s o l d  o n  v e r y  e xpens i v e  
h o u s e s ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  w h i c h  e x c e e d s  t h e  m a x i m u m  a m o u n t  i n s u r a b l e  u n d e r  t h e  
N F I P.  
43  T h e  f l o o d  i n s u r a n c e  m a n d a t e  w a s  f i r s t  a d d e d  a s  part o f  t h e  F l o o d  D i s a s t e r  
P r o t e c t i o n  A c t  o f  1 9 7 3 ,   P u b. L. N o. 9 3 - 2 3 4 ,  §  1 0 2 ,  8 7  S t a t. 9 7 5 ,  9 7 9  ( c o d i f i e d  a t  
4 2  U.S.C §  4 0 1 2 a ).  I t  w a s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  b y  t h e  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  R e f o r m  A c t  o f  
1 9 9 4 ,  P u b. L. N o. 1 0 3 - 3 2 5 ,  § §  5 0 1 – 5 8 4 ,  1 0 8  S t a t. 2 1 6 0 ,  2 2 5 5 – 8 7.  
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on w hen is s uing a home  mortg age loan. 44  (Why the purchase of  f lood 
ins urance needs  to be mandated is  not clear. Private lenders , w ho s tand 
to los e their collateral if  it is  unins ured, are s urely s ophisticated enough 
to add f lood ins urance to the of ten lengthy lis t of  ins urance coverages  
they require f rom borrow ers ).   
Unlike private ins urers , the N F IP  cannot rej ect applicants. It als o 
does  not have the f lexibility to  adj us t premiums to match the f ull ris k. 
These tw o f actors  create an advers e s election problem — ins ured 
properties a re more likely to exp ect loss es  exceeding their prem iums.  
Becaus e of  thes e advers e s election problems and the underpricing of  
f lood coverage  in the mos t ris k - prone areas , the  N F IP  is  operating at a 
mas s ive def icit , es timated in 2014 to be around $24 billion .  Moreover, 
given recent legis lative events  (dis cus s ed below ) there appears to be no 
prospect of that debt being repaid any time s oon , or that the chronic 
underpricing problem w ould be alleviated .45    
The rates  charged by N F IP  to its  policyholders  a re bas ed on 
f lood maps that are created and maintained by F EM A. 46  Thos e map s are 
bas ed on F EM A ’s  s tatis tical s tudies  of  river f low s , rainf all, s torm tides , 
and hydrologic f actors. 47   The maps themselves  identif y , among other 
things ,  “ special f lood hazard areas ”  (S F H A s ), in w hich there is  roughly a 
1  percent  chance of  f lood each year and a 25  percent  chance of  f lood 
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44  T h e  f l o o d  i n s u r a n c e  m a n d a t e  h a s  n o t  b e e n  w e l l  e n f o r c e d ,  f o r  r e a s o n s  d i s c u s s e d  
b e l o w.  A l s o ,  t h e r e  u s e d  t o  b e  a  f e d e r a l  m a n d a t e  t h a t  c r op in s u r a n c e  b e  purc h a s e d ,  
b u t  t h i s  g e n e r a l  m a n d a t e  w a s  r epeale d  i n  1 9 9 6. 7  U.S.C. §  1 5 1 9 ,  r e p e a l e d  b y  P u b. 
L. N o. 1 0 4 - 1 2 7 ,  §  1 9 6 ( j ) ,  1 1 0  S t a t. 8 8 8 ,  9 5 0  ( 1 9 9 6 ).  
45  G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 1 4 - 2 9 7 R ,  O V E R V I E W  O F  G A O ' S  P A S T  
W O R K  O N  T H E  N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M  1  ( 2 0 1 4 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 6 7 0 / 6 6 2 4 3 8.pdf . F E M A  i s  a u t h o r i z e d  t o  b o r r o w  f r o m  
t h e  T r e a s u r y  D epartm e n t  w h e n  N F I P  payo u t s  e x c e e d  c o l l e c t e d  prem i u m s.  S i n c e  
t h e  h u r r i c a n e s  o f  2 0 0 5 ,  t h i s  b o r r o w i n g  l i m i t  h a s  b e e n  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  $ 2  b i l l i o n  t o  
$ 3 0  b i l l i o n. I d .  a t  9. T h e  B i g g e r t - W a t e r s  A c t ,  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  t e x t  b e l o w ,  r e q u i r e d  
F E M A  t o  put f o r w a r d  a  plan  b y  J a n u a r y  o f  2 0 1 3  f o r  r epayin g  t h i s  d e b t . T h a t  h a s  
n o t  h appene d. In  f a c t ,  F E M A  i s  n o t  e v e n  c o l l e c t i n g  e n o u g h  i n  f l o o d  i n s u r a n c e  
prem i u m s  t o  c o v e r  t h e  i n t e r e s t  paym e n t s  o n  t h e  d e b t.  I d .  a t  9 – 1 1  ( d i s c u s s i n g  
F E M A ’ s  t r o u b l e d  d e b t  w i t h  T r e a s u r y ).  
46  N atio n a l  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  P r o g r a m ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y ,  
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / n a t i o n a l - f l o o d - i n s u r a n c e - prog r a m - f l o o d - h a z a r d - m apping  
( l a s t  update d  O c t. 2 3 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ;  F l o o d i n g  a n d  F l o o d  R i s k s :  U n d e r stan d i n g  F l o o d  
M a p s ,  N A T ’ L  F L O O D  I N S . P R O G R A M ,  
h t tps:// w w w.flo o d s m a r t.go v / f l o o d s m a r t /page s / f l o o d i n g _ f l o o d _ r i s k s / u n d e r s t a n d i n g _
f l o o d _ m aps.jsp(la s t  v i s i t e d  N o v. 6 ,  2 0 1 4 ).  
47  N A T ’ L  F L O O D  I N S . P R O G R A M ,  s u p r a  n o t e  4 9.  
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over the cours e of  30 years — the length of  mos t home mortgages. 48   
Thes e are the areas  in w hich mortgage lenders  are s uppo sed to mandate 
coverage and w here the f lood ins urance rates  are s upposed to be the 
highes t.  
There are at leas t three s erious  problems w ith the N F IP ’s  us e of  
f lood maps in pricing policies.  First, the maps themselves  are of ten out 
of  date , w hich produces t w o types of errors — s ome properties w rongly 
being deemed f lood - f ree and others  w rongly deemed f lood - prone . 49   
Second, even w hen the maps are updated, there are cros s - s ubs idies  
among ins ureds  w ithin the s ys tem .  FEMA its elf  admits  that  a s ub s tantial 
percen tage of  property owners  in high - ris k areas  w ere paying well below  
actuarial rates. 50  While a  2012  ref orm intended  to correct this  actuarial 
dis crepancy, legis lation in 2014 es s entially postponed such ref orm  
indef initely , and probably killed it . Third, even if  the F EM A  maps are 
updated and the rates  are made more actuarially s ound, political 
inf luence w ill continue to interf ere in  the process of  characterizing 
particular areas  as  f lood - prone. 51   
In response to years  of  complaints about and s tudies  documenting 
the inef f iciencies  inherent in the N F IP , law makers  in 2012 responded by 
enacting the s o - called Biggert - Waters  F lood Ins urance Ref orm A ct 
(BW). 52   BW s ought  to gradually  eliminate  the underf unding of  the N F IP  
and curb the dis turbing  cros s - s ubs idies  built int o the program .  For 
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48  F l o o d  Z o n e s ,  F E D . E M E R G E N C Y  M G M T . A G E N C Y ,  
h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / f l o o dplain - m a n a g e m e n t / f l o o d - z o n e s  ( l a s t  update d  J u l y  2 4 ,  
2 0 1 4 ).  
49  C O N G . B U D G E T  O F F I C E ,  P U B . N O . 4 0 0 8 ,  T H E  N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  
P R O G R A M :  F A C T O R S  A F F E C T I N G  A C T U A R I A L  S O U N D N E S S  1 4  ( ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.cb o.go v / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / c b o f i l e s / f tpdoc s / 1 0 6 x x / d o c 1 0 6 2 0 / 1 1 - 0 4 -
f l o o d i n s u r a n c e.pdf ; s e e  a l s o  T h e o d o r i c  M e y e r ,  U s i n g  O utdated  D ata, F E M A  i s  
W r o n g l y  P l a c i n g  H o m e o w n e r s  i n  F l o o d  Z o n e s ,  P R O P U B L I C A  ( J u l y  1 8 ,  2 0 1 3 ,  1 2 : 0 7  
P M )  h t tp://w w w.propubli c a.or g / a r t i c l e / u s i n g - o u t d a t e d - d a t a - f e m a - i s - w r o n g l y -
plac i n g - h o m e o w n e r s - i n - f l o o d - z o n e s .  C h a n g e s  m a d e  b y  B i g g e r t - W a t e r s  w e r e  
s uppose d  t o  i mprov e  t h e  updati n g  proc e s s. I d .; S c o t t  G a b r i e l  K n o w l e s ,  B i g g e rt -
W aters  a n d  N F I P :  F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  S h o u l d  B e  Stre n gthe n e d ,  S l a t e  ( M a r c h  2 3 ,  
2 0 1 4 ,  1 1 : 4 7  P M ) ,  
h t tp://w w w.sla t e.co m / a r t i c l e s / h e a l t h _ a n d _ s c i e n c e / s c i e n c e / 2 0 1 4 / 0 3 / b i g g e r t _ w a t e r s _
a n d _ n f ip_flo o d _ i n s u r a n c e _ s h o u l d _ b e _ s t r e n g t h e n e d.htm l.  
50  R A W L E  O.  K I N G ,  C O N G . R E S E A R C H  S E R V .,  R 4 2 8 5 0 ,  T H E  N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  
I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M :  S T A T U S  A N D  R E M A I N I N G  I S S U E S  F O R  C O N G R E S S  1 9 – 2 0  
( 2 0 1 3 ).  
51  S e e  B i l l  D e d m a n ,  F B I  I n v e stig a tes F E M A  F l o o d  M a p  C h a n g e s  A fter  N B C  N e w s  
R e p o rt ,  N B C  N E W S  ( M a r. 2 7 ,  2 0 1 4 ) ,  
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example, BW w as  going to phase out the s ubs idies  entirely f or certain 
“ repetitive los s  properties,”  s econd  homes , bus ines s  properties, homes  
that have been s ubs tantially improved or damaged, and homes  s old to 
new  ow ners.  BW permit ted  much f as ter N F IP  annual rate increas es  (25  
percent annually, up from previous 10  percent cap) , and require d  all 
premiums to be bas ed on “ average his torical los s  years ,” including 
catas trophic loss  years.  One of  the mos t controvers ial aspects of  the new  
la w  w as  the elimination of  grandf athering f or the many older buildings  
in high - ris k areas.   
However, the backlas h  f rom property owners  along coas tal areas , 
w here res ulting premium increas es  w ere the  greates t, w as  s w if t and 
ef f ective .53  In s ome areas , there w ere reports of  homeow ners ’  premiums 
ris ing ten f old. 54   The concern expressed by many law makers , on behalf  
of  their angry cons tituents , w as  that unles s  BW w as  repealed or at leas t 
delayed, they w ouldn’t be able to remain in their homes  or continue their 
s mall bus ines s es.  Thus, bef ore BW w as  able to take ef f e ct , Congres s  
passed in 2014 the H omeow ner F lood Ins urance A f f ordability A ct  
(H F IA A ) 5 5 , w hich s ignif icantly w eakened the changes  made by BW. The 
political pressure to repeal BW w as  s o s ucces s f ul that even 
Representative M axine Waters  voted in s upport of repe aling her ow n 
b ill. As a res ult , the 2014 A c t  imposed tighter  limits on yearly premium 
increas e s , reins tate d  the N F IP  grandf athering provision , and preserved 
the dis counted premiums f or  s old properties.  The new  law  als o call ed  on 
F EM A  to keep premiums at no more than 1 percent  of  the value of  the 
coverage.  
 
2 . Flor ida’s  Citizens Pr operty Insurance Cor por ation  
The other example of large - s c a l e  government - s old ins urance f or 
w eather ris k is  F lorida’s  Citizens  P roperty I ns urance  Corporation  
(Citizens ) — a s tate ow ned company that specializes  in w ind - damage (and 
other, multiple - peril) coverage f or homeow ners  and bus ines s es  in 
F lorida.   Wind  damage , of  cours e, is  the larges t element of  w eather  ris k  
covered by thes e policies, s ince f lood  damage , the other maj or w eather  
peril , is  already  covered almos t exclus ively by the N F IP . Indeed, 
Citizens  provides the vas t maj ority of  the w ind ins urance f or properties 
on the coas t of  F lorida; and in many high - ris k coas tal areas , Citizens  is  
the only ins urer  in F lorida  o f f ering w ind policies.  The company collects  
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premiums that are us ed to pay the los s es  covered under the policies , but, 
as  w ith the N F IP , the premiums are f ar below  w hat is  neces s ary to cover 
the f ull ris k. 56  
At f irs t glance,  Citizens  appears to price  its wi nd coverage in the 
s ame w ay private ins urers  do.  Citizens  begin s  by evaluating  the ris k of  
w ind damage in particular areas.  The areas  co ns is t of  1 50  geogr a phic 
rating territories.  Citizens  gives  e ach territory a particular rate that tak es 
into account w eather patterns , cons truction  methods , and past loss es  in 
that area . Citizens  s e t s  the  w ind rates  w ith the us e of  s ophisticated 
computer modeling techniques , inf ormed by data about hurricane 
patterns, and a dj us ted periodically bas ed on new  inf ormation and  
updated experience .  These bas e rates  are then us ed by Citizens  to 
determine the individualized premium  charged f or individual policies.  
This rating methodology is  identical to the approach  f ollow ed by 
private ins urers ,  w ith one big dif f eren ce . Citizens ’ premiums  do not  
ref lect the actuarial ris k as s ociated w ith each ins ured property .57  Several 
reas ons  help to explain the gap between true ris k and charged premiums .  
First, s tate regulations  place limits  on the extent to w hich premiums can 
be increas ed, even w hen premiums are priced below  actual ris ks.  
Second, there is  s ome cros s - s ubs idization among the 150  territories  at 
the level of  rate - s etting. 58  Third , and mos t s ignif ica ntly,  Citizens  does  
not f ace the s ame budgetary cons traints  that private ins urers  do . If it f alls  
s hort — if  the premiums collected are not enough to pay for the w ind 
damage it covers — Citizens  can invoke an “ as s es s ment” process to cover 
the s hortf all. As a r es ult,  s ome of  the catas trophic wind ris k posed by 
hurricanes  is  s hif ted f rom  Citizens ’ policyholders  to  F lorida  taxpayers . 
Under the as s es s ment process, Citizens  can s ecure emergency 
f unding f or catas trophic loss es  that exceed its ow n res erves , as  w ell as  its 
various  s ources  of  reins urance, by imposing  a tax  not only on all 
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I n s u r a n c e  C o mpany  ( J u l y  1 9 ,  2 0 1 3 )  [ h e r e i n a f t e r  S u m n e r  I n t e r v i e w ].  
58  S u m n e r  I n t e r v i e w.  
! #%%#!
Citizens ’  policyholders  but als o on all ins urance policyholders  (including 
homeow ners  and car  ow ners ,  among others ) w ithin the s tate.  Part of  this  
as s es s ment/tax is  collected up front, and part is spread out over a number 
of  years , until the def icit is  paid. 59   The net ef f ect is  that the premium s  
actually charged by Citizens  to a policyholder f or a given piece of  
property  of ten do not ref lect the f ull actuarial ris k as s ociated w ith that 
ins ured property .  Moreover, as  w e s how  in detail below , the s ubs idies  
are not allocated equally among Citizens ’ policyholders.   
 
* * *  
In s um, through a variety of  programs, the government ins ures  
w eather ris k. Some of  thes e programs rely on largely the s ame actuarial 
methodology as  us ed by private ins ur ers : coverage only f or premium -
paying policyholders , rating the ris k according to his t orical los s  and 
claims  data, and dif f erentiation of  premiums through f eature rating that 
is  s ens itive to the policyholders ’ idios yncratic ris k  and mitigation . Other 
programs provide relief  more univers ally, to all victims  of  dis as ter . 
Whether it is  through the s elling of  ins urance policies or through dis as ter 
relief , government ins urance relies  on more than the collected premium 
to f und coverage , and is  heavily s upported by taxpayers . 
We now  turn to evaluat e  the s ucces s  of  government i ns urance as  
an ex ante regulator of  w eather ris k, and compare it to the tools  utilized 
by private ins urance.  
 
III.  THE D ISTORTIONS OF G OVERNMENT W EATHER INSURANCE  
 
P art I introduce d  the bas ic ques tion w e are as king in this  article: 
What are  the tool s  avai lable to ins urers  in  regulating w eather ris k ? H ow  
does  ins urance induce  policy holders  to ins tall s af ety meas ures  and to 
choos e s af er locations  f or habitation ? We s aw  that ins urance has  the 
capacity to perform the s ame s ocial f unction as  public regulation  like 
zoning and building codes , operating bef ore s evere w eather occurs  to 
induce better preparedness . 
Insurance can be provided either by private organizations  or by 
the government. In Part II w e explained that much of  the ins urance f or 
s evere w eather ris k in the U.S is provided by the government, through a 
variety of  programs, s ome res embling the  s tructure of  private ins urance  
and others  of f ering purely ex post relief.  We als o explained that private 
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w eather ins urance markets  have declined largely becaus e of  the  
government’s  provision of  low er - priced  alternatives.  
We are now  ready to apply the conceptual framew ork of  P art I 
( how  ins urance regulates ) to the exis ting environment des cribed in P art 
II (government ins urance f or f lood and w ind). This w ill help us  answ er a 
normative ques tion: H ow  w ell does  government ins urance perform as  a 
regulator of  w eather ris k? In particular, how  does  it f are relative to the 
performance of  private ins urance?  Would it be better to outs ource the 
regulatory role of  s evere  w eather  preparedness  to private ins urance 
markets ?  
G iven the underdeveloped private market f or w eather ins urance , 
w e cannot line up the two ins titution s  neck - to - neck and compare. 
Instead, w e identif y element s  that are unique to government - provided 
ins ur ance, and evaluate their ef f ects. These ef f ects  can then be compared 
wit h  hypothetical private ins urance patterns, given w hat is  know n about 
private ins urance operation in other markets.  
The analys is  below  examine s  the government’s  ins urance 
performance  a long tw o normative metrics : f airnes s  and ef f iciency. 
Section A  examines  the dis tributive ef f ects  of  government ins urance and 
tries  to ans w er a ques tion of ten lef t unas ked: w ho are the benef iciaries  of  
the implicit subs idies  inherent in government ins urance ? Is  it a 
progressive redis tributive s cheme? S ection B examines  the productive 
ef f iciency aspects of  government ins urance: how  does  it af f ect 
inves tment incentives ?  H ow  does  it af f ect total w elf are?  
 
A. Distributive Effects  
Now, is  this a bailout for the rich  people?  
--  Representative Bill Cas s idy (R - LA) 6 0  
 
1.  Ins ur ance Cr os s - Subs idies : Who ar e the beneficiar ies ?  
P rivate ins urance covers  only premium - paying policyholders.  
That is  how  ins urance markets  w ork : ris k - avers e parties pay premiums to 
a privately  managed f und that is  contractually bound to cover certain 
specified los s es  if  they occur.  In a competitive environment , the 
premiums ins urers  collect (minus  adminis trative cos ts ) mus t roughly 
equal the amount of  the payouts.  It f ollow s  that private ins u r ance  cannot 
pay claims  of  victims  w ho have not paid into the ins urance pool.  It als o 
cannot s ys tematically undercharge s ome policyholder s , becaus e that 
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w ould require an of f s etting s ys tematic overcharge of  others. Those 
overcharged, how ever, w ould  be cherry - picked by competitors w ho can 
of f er them better terms. In private ins urance, any redis tribution occurs  
w ithin the pool of policyholders  and only ex  post — namely, f rom lucky 
non - victims  to unlucky victims. As long as  premiums are s et according 
to the ris k data, there is  no ex ante cros s - s ubs idy — no policyholder pays 
for an expected benef it that others  enj oy disproportionately.  
By contras t, becaus e government ins urance is  partially f unded by  
general tax revenues , there is  no s uch actuarial budget  con s traint. In fact, 
g overnment r elief  programs and ins urance plans are  specifically  intended 
to create s ys tematic trans f er f avoring res idents  of  dis as ter areas . And 
u nlike private ins urance, government s old ins urance can contain a  
s ys tematic and intended  dis count to make its  policies more af f ordable, 
and the def icit  can be covered  through the government’s  general budget . 
Indeed , th e unique f eature of  government ins urance  compared with 
private ins urance, and the primary reas on f or es tablis hing it, is  precisely 
the creation of  a n ex ante  cros s - s ubs idy s cheme.  
Such cros s - s ubs id ies  obvious ly conf lict w ith actuarial 
conceptions of  f airnes s — charging every person who is  covered by an 
ins urance policy a premium equal to that person’s expected benef its  
und er the policy (“ to each according to h er  benef it”). Actuarial f airnes s  
has  an intuitive appeal, for example, when dif f erences  in ris ks  are the 
res ult of  individuals ’ voluntary choices. It seems  f air that s mokers  s hould 
pay higher lif e and health ins urance premiums than non - s mokers , and 
that aggres s ive  drivers  pay higher auto ins urance premiums. 61  
The cros s - s ubs idy embodied in government ins urance  is  an 
intended f eature  despite it s  violati on of  actuarial f airnes s , becaus e it is  
thought to be f air and progressive. In the af termath of  H urricane K atrina, 
f or example, Representative Barney F rank promoted increas ed f unding 
to the N F IP  becaus e of  “ our moral duty to the poorest people and 
w orking people and low er middle income people.” 6 2  More recently , 
w hen Congres s  reins tated the s ubs idized f lood ins urance rates  in 2014  
(af ter a previous bill s ought to s cale dow n the s ubs idies ) , the bill w a s  
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pitched as  a program f avoring s truggling homeow ners.  It  garnered 
bipartisan s upp ort (approved with a vote of  72 - 22 in the S enate) becaus e 
cuts  in s ubs idies  “ burdened low er -  and middle - clas s  homeow ners  and 
s mall bus ines s es .” 6 3  As the H ous e voted dow n an amendment to the bill 
that w ould have removed retroactive reimburs ements  of  high pre miums 
to the ow ners  of  coas tal vacation homes , 6 4  representatives  invoked 
progressive s entiments  by alluding to anecdotal s tories  of  the s uf f ering of  
low er - clas s , middle - clas s , and s enior citizens  as  a res ult of  the previously 
enacted premium hikes. The subs idies , one Congres s man s aid, w ill 
prevent w orking f amilies , w ho are “ doing everything they can to put 
food on the table,” f rom los ing their homes. 65  As one of  the Bill’s  
champions explained,  
“ This  is  not about the millionaires  in mans ions  on the 
beach.  . . These are middle clas s , w orking people 
living in normal, middle clas s  hous es  doing their bes t 
to rais e their kids , contribute to their communities  and 
make a living.” 6 6  
Thes e ins urance s ubs idy s chemes  are  appealing becaus e the ris k 
dif f erences  are thought to be arbitrary, not the res ult of  voluntary choice. 
People suff ering high ris k  of  w eather dis as ters  are hardly at f ault, their 
los s es  are of ten devas tating , and their ins urance premium s  are f inancially 
crus hing . Thus, w hen polled, even people who are not af f ected by f lood 
ins urance premium s ubs idies  (but w ho, perhaps unbeknow ns t to them, 
pay taxes  to f und them ) s trongly s upport the s ubs idies. In one s urvey, 
only 15% of  unaf f ected F lorida citizens  s upported the pre mium 
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prem i u m s  a f f o r d a b l e  f o r  t h e  s m a l l  b u s i n e s s e s  .  . . c h u r c h e s ,  s c h o o l s ,  a n d  n o n -
prof i t s.”) ;  I d .  a t  H 1 6 0 1  ( d a i l y  e d. F e b. 5 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( s t a t e m e n t  o f  R ep. K il m e r )  
( c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e  prem i u m  i n c r e a s e s  h a v e  a l r e a d y  h u r t  h i s  d i s t r i c t  “ s t r u g g l [ i n g ]  
w i t h  d o u b l e - d i g i t  u n e mploy m e n t ” ).  
6 4  I d . at S 1 6 2 7  ( d a i l y  e d. M a r. 1 3 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( s t a t e m e n t  o f  S e n. L e e ).  
6 5  S e e ,  e . g . ,  I d .  a t  S 5 8 1  ( d a i l y  e d. J a n. 2 9 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( S t a t e m e n t  o f  S e n. H e i t k a mp).  
66  I d .  a t  S 1 6 3 1  ( d a i l y  e d. M a r. 1 3 ,  2 0 1 4 )  ( s t a t e m e n t  o f  S e n. L a n d r i e u ).  
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increas es. 67  The af f ordability concern , bols tered by a s trong intuition that 
the benef iciaries  of  the s ubs idies  are low er - middle income f amilies , 
trumps the amorphous conception of  actuarial f airnes s  as  a w ay to 
achieve dis tributive j us tice.  
The cros s - s ubs idy created  by government - s old ins urance f ollow s , 
then, a dis tinct logic: it moves  f rom people lucky enough to live in s af e 
areas  (“ the af f luent”)  to the les s  lucky res idents  living in low  lying areas  
in s torms ’ paths  (“the poor ”) . But t his  conj ecture , that s ubs idized f lood 
ins urance benef its  the les s  af f luent, has  not been tes ted. We believe that 
it is  w rong  and that the opposite is true : the s ubs idy accrues  primarily to 
the af f luent . This  f or a s imple reason: thos e w ho need f lood ins urance 
mos t are the  habitants  of  properties build in proximity to the coas t , w here 
s evere w eather s trikes  mos t f orcef ully. Becaus e properties adj acent to the 
coas t are in general  ( putting w eather ris k to one s ide)  more des irable and 
more expensive, the benef iciaries  of  th e s ubs idies  are not the poor but 
the af f luent .68  
If in f act  the high - ris k beachf ront ow ners  are, all els e equal, 
w ealthier, they are  les s  des erving of  means - bas ed  government s ubs id ies . 
Moreover, any f orm of  government - s ubs idized ins urance — dis as ter relief  
or contractual policies — is  f unded through general tax revenues ,  6 9  
coming f rom middle income taxpayers living mos tly  inland in low er -
valued homes  (or, as  w e s aw , f rom as s es s ments  on drivers  buying auto 
ins urance) . To the extent that high - income ow ners  of  b eachf ront property 
are the primary benef iciaries  of  this  government ins urance s cheme,  and 
to the extent that the cros s - s ubs idy is  disproportionately f unded by the  
les s  af f luent inland - res iding taxpayers  and policyholders ,  w e  argue  that it 
represents a regr es s ive f orm of  redis tribution . And, as  a matter of  public 
choice , the more the government has  to bail out its  under - capitalized 
ins urance f und, the les s  tax revenue remains  to spend on other, more 
progressive programs.  
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67  J e f f  H a r r i n g t o n ,  P o l l :  O p p o s itio n  to F l o o d  I n s u r a n c e  R ate H i k e s  i s  Stro n g ,  
T A M P A  B A Y  T I M E S ,  D e c  2 4 ,  2 0 1 3 ,  
h t tp://w w w.ta mpab a y.co m / n e w s / b u s i n e s s / b a n k i n g /poll - opposit i o n - t o - f l o o d -
i n s u r a n c e - r a t e - h i k e s - i s - s t r o n g / 2 1 5 8 5 0 8.  
68  C O N G . B U D G E T  O F F I C E ,  P U B . N O . 2 8 0 7 ,  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S  I N  T H E  
N A T I O N A L  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M  ( 2 0 0 7 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.cb o.go v / s i t e s / d e f a u l t / f i l e s / c b o f i l e s / f tpdoc s / 8 2 x x / d o c 8 2 5 6 / 0 6 - 2 5 -
f l o o d i n s u r a n c e.pdf [ h e r e i n a f t e r  C B O ,  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S ].  
69  S e e ,  e . g . ,  L e t t e r  f r o m  J a n e t  N apolit a n o ,  S e c ’ y  o f  D ep’t o f  H o m e l a n d  S e c u r i t y ,  t o  
R ep. B a r n e y  F r a n k  ( Apr. 2 4 ,  2 0 0 9 )  ( “ T h e  [ O b a m a ]  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  i s  a s k i n g  f o r  
d e b t  f o r g i v e n e s s  b e c a u s e  t h e  s i z e  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e b t  c r e a t e s  a n  u n s t a b l e  f i n a n c i a l  
s i t u a t i o n  f o r  t h e  N F I P  a n d  t h e  s u b s i d i z e d  i n s u r a n c e  prem i u m  s t r u c t u r e  d o e s  n o t  a n d  
w i l l  n o t  a l l o w  t h e  N F I P  t o  c o l l e c t  e n o u g h  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e  d e b t  o r  r epay i t.”).  
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We w is h to tes t our  regres s ive redis tribution hypothesis, and w e 
do s o in tw o w ays. First, w e examine the dis tribution of  s ubs idies  under 
F lorida’s  Citizens  ins urance. We begin w ith this  s cheme becaus e w e 
have data about actual prices and s ubs idies , w hich allow s  us  to meas ur e 
d irectly the direction of  the redis tribution. Second, w e return to the N F IP  
and point to  s ome indirect evidence regarding  the direction  of  
redis tribution. Together, thes e obs ervations  s ugges t that government 
w eather ins urance has  unappreciated but s ubs ta ntial regres s ive ef f ects . 
 
2.  Redistribution under  Flor ida’s  Citizens Pr operty Insurance  
 
T he state subsidiz ed the well - to - do who live near  
the beach at the expens e of the less - well - to - do 
who don’t.  
 —  M ichael Lew is , N ew  Y ork Times 7 0  
 
a.  Citizen s ’  data and s ome initial obs ervations  
Citizens  w ind - peril ins urance policies are s old to homeow ners  in 
every part of F lorida. The policies are priced according to the w ind 
territory in w hich the ins ured property is located. There are 150 s uch 
territories. Prices  are adj us t ed annually and have to be approved by the 
s tate O f f ice of  Ins urance Regulation. Statutory and regulatory caps limit 
the extent to w hich Citizens  can rais e its  rates  in any given year.  
As dis cus s ed above, Citizens ’ actual ins urance premiums are 
know n — and intended to be — dif f erent than the “ true ris k” premiums 
(thos e representing an actuarially accurate methodology). For every 
calendar year, Citizens  publishes  charts  lis ting, f or each individual 
policy, the actual premium and the true ris k hypothetical premi um, 
allo w ing a s traight f orw ard calculation of  the s ubs idy each policy 
receives  ( i n 2012, there w ere 527,250 individual policies) . This is  the 
“policy level data.” In addition, b ecaus e policies are rated and priced 
bas ed on their ris k territory, and becaus e  all policies w ithin a given 
territory enj o y the s ame proportional s ubs idy, s ome of  the inf ormation 
can be analyzed by comparing patterns acros s  territories. For that, w e 
us ed aggregated “ territory level data.” 7 1   
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70  M i c h a e l  L e w i s ,  I n  N atur e ’ s  C a s i n o ,  N.Y.  T IM E S  M A G A Z I N E ,  A u g. 2 6 ,  2 0 0 7 ,  a t  
5 1 ,  a v a i l a b l e  at   
h t tp://w w w.ny t i m e s.co m / 2 0 0 7 / 0 8 / 2 6 / m a g a z i n e / 2 6 n e w o r l e a n s - t.htm l.  
7 1  T h e  d a t a  o n  w h i c h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r t s  a n d  s t a t i s t i c s  a r e  b a s e d  w e r e  s upplie d  t o  
t h e  a u t h o r s  b y  C i t i z e n s  P r operty  I n s u r a n c e  C o mpany  i n  r e spons e  t o  a  publi c  d a t a  
r e q u e s t.  T h e  d a t a ,  w h i c h  w e r e  c o mpile d  b y  C i t i z e n s  f o r  t h e  purpose  o f  i t s  
S eptem b e r  3 0 ,  2 0 1 2 ,  r a t e - f i l i n g  w i t h  t h e  F l o r i d a  O f f i c e  o f  I n s u r a n c e  R e g u l a t i o n  
( specif i c a l l y ,  f r o m  F l o r i d a  O f f i c e  o f  I n s u r a n c e  R e g u l a t i o n  f i l i n g  n u m b e r  1 3 - 1 3 0 4 8 ) ,  
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To get a general s ens e of  the s ubs idy picture, w e looked initially 
at the territory data. Here, in publicly available rate f ilings , Citizens  
publishes  s ummaries  f o r  each of  the 150 ris k territories , s how ing the 
total s um of  premiums paid by policyholders  i n that territory, as well as  
the “ indicated” rate change , that is , how  much more (or les s ) it ought to 
charge policyholders  in that territory to break even  actuarially . Here is  an 
example: 7 2  
 
Territory N ame  Wind P remium  Indicated Rate 
Change  
M onroe  $38,582 ,378  126.5%  
Hills borough, Exc. Tampa  $19,496,173  25.9%  
Pinellas  –  S aint P eters burg  $29,059,878  14.7%  
Brow ard (Excl. Hllwd & F t. 
Ldrdle)  
$70,297,604  - 12.5%  
Brow ard  (Wind 47)  $27,847,251  57.3%  
Brow ard  (Wind 48)  $21,530,419  17.3%  
 
In M onroe territory, f or example, where s ome of  the s outh 
F lorida keys  are located, the premiums actually collected by Citizens  
total $38,582,378, but they f all s hort of  Citizen s ’ es timate of  the 
expected ris k, and an increas e of  126.5% in the premium char ged to each 
policy in that territory w ould be neces s ary to cover this  s hortf all. In 
Tampa’s suburbs  or in S aint P eters burg, the s hortf all in premiums is  
more modes t, 25.9% and 14.7%, respectively. Many  of  the highly 
populated F lorida areas , s uch as  Brow ard  County w here  F t. Lauderdale 
is  located,  are divided into s everal ris k territories. As the chart above 
s how s , s ome of  thes e territories , like the one labeled Wind 47, receive a 
s ubs tantial s ubs idy (57.3% above the actual cos t); others , like Wind 48, 
receiv e a modes t s ubs idy (17.3%); and s ome are actually overcharged 
and receive a negative s ubs idy. 73  
Since there are 150 territories  and they vary greatly by the 
amount of  s ubs id ies  they receive, w e w anted to s ee if  any pattern might  
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i n c l u d e  a  r a n g e  o f  f a c t s  a b o u t  e v e r y  h o m e o w n e r s ’  polic y  o f  a  parti c u l a r  s o r t  ( H O 3  
polic i e s  c o v e r i n g  w i n d  r i s k )  i s s u e d  b y  C i t i z e n s  i n  t h e  r e l e v a n t  perio d.  T h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  f o r  e a c h  polic y  i n c l u d e s  t h e  prem i u m  a c t u a l l y  c h a r g e d  f o r  t h e  polic y ,  
t h e  “ i n d i c a t e d  prem i u m ”  f o r  t h e  polic y ,  t h e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n s u r e d  property  b y  z ip 
co d e ,  a n d  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c o v e r a g e ,  a m o n g  o t h e r  t h i n g s.  W e  w i l l  c i t e  t h e s e  d a t a  
g e n e r a l l y  a s  “ C i t i z e n s  2 0 1 2  W i n d  R i s k  D a t a.” C opies  o f  t h e  d a t a  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  w i t h  
t h e  a u t h o r s  a n d  c a n  b e  s e c u r e d  s epara t e l y  f r o m  C i t i z e n s  t h r o u g h  a  publi c  d a t a  
r e q u e s t.  
72  C i t i z e n s  2 0 1 2  W i n d  R i s k  D a t a ,  s u p r a  n o t e  7 1 . 
73  I d .  
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be dis cerned. To that end , w e created a map of Florida by ris k territories  
and colored each territory according to the magnitude of  the s ubs idy it 
receives. The darker the s hade  of  green , the higher  the s ubs idy  
represented on the map :  
Figure 3 Here  
F igure 3  s how s  a remarkable, but perhaps predictable, pattern. 
Coastal territories , almos t w ithout exception, enj oy large percentage 
s ubs idies , w hereas  inland territories  receive s maller s ubs idies , if  they 
receive any s ubs idy at all.  As similar relations hip can be s een  w hen w e 
zoom in an d look at dens ely populated S outh F lorida:  
Figure 4 Here  
The pattern is  even clearer here : the s ubs idies  are larger in 
territories  very clos e to  the w a t e r . Figures  1 and 2  als o help us begin to 
conj ecture  a possible  relation betw een s ubs idy and w ealth , s ince w ater 
proximity is  of ten a f eature attracting w ealthy home buyers . 74  To 
vis ualize this , w e plotted on the s ubs idy maps the loc ation of  the highes t 
and low es t  w ealth concentrations. Red dots  mark  territor ies  in w hich the 
median home  value is  at leas t three s tandard deviations  above the 
s t a t e w ide  media n . 75  Blue dots  mark areas  more than one s tandard 
deviation  below  median home  value . No surprise: w ealthy hous eholds  
are located in the high s ubs idy (deep green) territories. Poor hous eholds  
are located more  of ten in the low -  or no - s ubs idy territories.  
These maps reflect the territory - bas ed data, comparing the 
treatment of  the 150 dif f erent ins urance ris k territories. Eventually, w e 
w ould like to test  if  the dis tribution of  s ubs idies  is  indeed correlated w ith  
the dis tribution of  w ealth. To do s o , w e needed more inf ormation about 
policyholders ’ w ealth. We used tw o s ources :  
(i) H ous ehold Value : Citizens ’ policy level data do  not include 
home values , but they do list the zip code s  of  the ins ured properties . 
Thus, w e w ere able to us e publicly available inf ormation about median 
hous ehold value w ithin the zip code in w hich the ins ured property is 
located. 76   
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74  C B O  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S ,  s u p r a  n o t e  6 8 ,  a t  9 – 1 0  ( f i g u r e s  s h o w i n g  t h a t  h o m e s  
c l o s e  t o  w a t e r  a r e  m o r e  e xpens i v e ).  
75  W e  u s e d  f o u r  d i f f e r e n t  s i z e s  t o  i n d i c a t e  3 - 4 ,  4 - 5 ,  5 - 6 ,  a n d  6 +  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n s  
a b o v e  s t a t e w i d e  m e d i a n.  
76  S e e  A m e r i c a n  F a ctFin d e r ,  U.S.  C E N S U S  B U R E A U ,   
h t tp://f a c t f i n d e r.ce n s u s.go v / f a c e s / n a v / j s f / page s / s e a r c h r e s u l t s.xh t m l  ( l a s t  v i s i t e d  J a n. 
6 ,  2 0 1 5 )  ( e n t e r i n g  “ B 2 5 0 7 7 :  M E D I A N  V A L U E  ( D O L L A R S ) ”  i n t o  t h e  “ t opic o r  
t a b l e  n a m e ”  s e a r c h  f i e l d  a n d  a n y  g i v e n  l o c a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  “ s t a t e ,  c o u n t y  o r  plac e  
( optio n a l ) ”  s e a r c h  f i e l d  w i l l  y i e l d  t h e  d e s i r e d  m e d i a n  h o u s e h o l d  v a l u e ).  
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(ii) Cover age  L i m it : Citi zens ’ policy level data include  an entry 
f or the amount of  ins urance purchased under each policy. Since 
ins urance law  does  not allow  the purchase of  coverage exceeding the 
value of  the property, we can us e the coverage amount as  a n es timate of  
the  low er bound of  the property ’s  value. This w ill help us te st w hether 
people who ow n low e r - valued homes  receive a greater or s maller 
ins urance s ubs idy. 77  
To f urther vis ualize the relation betw een s ubs idy and w ealth, w e 
us ed the zip  code level hous ehold value data. For each zip code, w e 
know  the median hous ehold value, and w e computed the average dollar 
value  s ubs idy f or all Citizens ’ policies is s ued in that zip code, taken f rom 
Citizens  policy - level data. When w e did this  f or all 904 F lorida zip 
codes, w e got the f o llow ing s catter plot:  
 
Figure 5 Here  
 
The trend line is  positive, s ugges ting that zip codes w ith higher 
valued homes  receive higher per - policy  subs idies . 
A similar picture emerges  if  w e look at policy level data and as k 
w hether high - value policies  (thos e  attached to high - value homes )  receive 
a higher or low er s ubs idy. We divided Citizens ’  policies in to f ive 
quintiles  according to the policy coverage amount. For each quintile, w e 
calculated the average s ubs idy. Again, w e s ee a clear picture: higher 
quintile s  of  w ealth get a higher abs olute  s ubs idy:   
 
Figure 6 Here  
 
b.  Empirical A nalys is  
In order to meas ure the disproportionate benef it of  the ins urance 
s ubs idy to the af f luent , w e us ed  Citizens ’ policy level data. For each 
policy, w e looked at tw o meas ure s  of  s ubs idy. First, w e looked at the 
s traightf orw ard “ abs olute s ubs idy” w hich is  the dif f erence betw een the 
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77  I n  t h e  y e a r  f r o m  w h i c h  o u r  d a t a  w e r e  t a k e n  ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  t h e r e  w a s  n o  upper l i m i t  o n  
t h e  v a l u e  o f  properti e s  o r  t h e  a m o u n t  o f  c o v e r a g e  i n  C i t i z e n s ’  polic i e s.  I n  2 0 1 4 ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h e  F l o r i d a  l e g i s l a t u r e  a d opted  a  l i m i t.  Specif i c a l l y ,  u n d e r  c u r r e n t  l a w ,  
C i t i z e n s  i s  o n l y  perm i t t e d  t o  prov i d e  c o v e r a g e  f o r  a  d w e l l i n g  up to  a  r eplac e m e n t  
c o s t  o f  $ 1  m i l l i o n  i n  2 0 1 4 ,  w i t h  t h i s  l i m i t  g o i n g  d o w n  b y  $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  per y e a r  e a c h  
y e a r  u n t i l  2 0 1 7 ,  w h e r e  t h e  c ap w o u l d  r e m a i n  a t  $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0. H o w e v e r ,  i f  
polic y h o l d e r s  c a n  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a b l e  t o  f i n d  c o v e r a g e  i n  t h e  priv a t e  
m a r k e t  f o r  polic i e s  i n  t h e  r a n g e  b e t w e e n  $ 7 0 0 , 0 0 0  a n d  $ 1  m i l l i o n ,  t h e n  t h e  $ 1  
m i l l i o n  c ap w il l  apply, r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  l o w e r  phas e d  i n  c aps in  l a t e r  y e a r s.  S e e  F L A . 
S T A T . §  6 2 7.35 1 ( 6 ) ( a ) ( 3 )  ( 2 0 1 4 ).  
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premium charged and the hypothetical premium ref lecting f ull ris k. 
Since Citizens  reports the “ indicated rate change” neces s ary to bring the 
actual premium to the f ull ris k level, this  abs olute s ubs idy f or each 
policy is  s imply the premium   charged f or that policy times  the  indicated 
rate change  f or that policy.  
But the abs olute s ubs idy may tell an incomplete story. A  $300 
s ubs idy f or a low - coverage  policy of , s ay, $50,000, may be a relatively 
more s ignif icant  f actor  than a $500 s ubs idy f or a high - coverage  policy  of  
$500,000 . We theref ore w anted to meas ure the relative s ubs idy each 
policy is  getting. To do this , w e created a s ynthetic benchmark in w h ich 
the s ubs idy pool  (the total amount of  s ubs idy f or all policies  w ithin the 
datas et ) is  divided pro rata acros s  the policies, under the (counterf actual) 
as s umption that all policies receive the s ame indicated rate change — the 
s ame percent dis count . We denoted this  benchmark  as a “ unit s ubs idy ,” 
w ith all policies receiving exactly one unit . We then compared this  unit -
s ubs idy benchmark w ith the actual percent dis count each policy 
received. This created a dis tribution of  “percent s ubs idies ,” s ome 
recei ving more than the unit benchmark , other s  receiving les s. We 
meas ured  w hether  this  “per cent s ubs idy”  dis tribution  w a s  correlated w ith 
hous ehold w e a l t h . Wealth, recall, is  meas ured in our es timates  in tw o 
dif f erent w ays : coverage limit under the policy and median zip code 
hous ehold value . 
We estimated tw o  regres s ion model s :  
 
L ogAbs oluteSubsidy i  = ! + " L ogWealth i  + # i  
 
Per cent Subsidy i  = ! + " L ogWealth i  + # i  
 
The f irs t model examines  how  increas e in w ealth correlates  w ith 
the abs olute s ubs idy. A one  percent  increas e in w ealth is  as s ociated w ith 
a "  percent  increas e in the abs olute s ubs idy. If ⇤ is  positive, there is  
positive correlation betw een w ealth and s ubs idy and the government’s  
program is  regres s ive. Table 1 presents our f indings.  
The res ults  are s tat is tically s ignif icant and demons trate a 
s ignif icant correlation betw een w ealth and s ubs idy. Column (1) in Table 
1 s how s  that a one  percent increas e in the Coverage variable is  
as s ociated w ith a 1.052  percent  increas e in the s ubs idy. Simply  put , if 
property  A is  w orth tw ice as  much as  property B, and thus  the ow ner of  
property A purchases  coverage that is  100  percent  greater than the 
coverage purchased by the ow ner of  property B , the ow ner of  A  enj oys  
on average a 105  percent  higher abs olute s ubs idy. Columns  (2) – (4) 
repeat this  tes t , and obtain the s ame res ult,  w ith f ixed ef f ects  f or policy, 
s tandard errors  clus tered by territory, and both. Column (5) us es  a 
! #&%#!
dif f erent independent variable to meas ure w ealth –  the average 
hous ehold value w ithin the ins ured home ’s  zip  code (“ Log H H  V alue”). 
The wealth coef f icient is  s maller, 0.484  percent  (predictably, given the 
us e of  average w ealth meas ures ). 78   
The s econd model examines  the relation betw een w ealth and our 
generated s ynthetic variable of  “percent s ubs idy.” The r es ults  are 
presented in table 2.  
Again, the s ubs idy is  s trongly correlated w ith w ealth. A one  
percent increas e in hous ehold value is  as s ociated w ith either a 0.847  
percent  or 0.571  percent  increas e in percent s ubs idy, depending on how  
w e meas ure w ealth, and the res ults  are again highly s ignif icant.  
c.  D is cus s ion  
The res ult s  reported above s how  that the w ind ins urance 
s ubs idies  w ithin policies s old by Citizens  P roperty Ins urance Company 
accrue disproportionately to af f luent hous eholds , and the magnitude  of  
this  regres s ive redis tribution is  s ubs tantial. While w e are unable to 
meas ure directly the w ealth of  policyholders , w e s how ed that people 
who buy higher coverage (namely , w ho ow n more expensiv e homes ), or, 
alternatively, people who live in w ealthier  zip codes ,  receive larger 
s ubs idies , both in abs olute magnitude and as  a percent of  their premium.  
The es timates  w e derived f or the correlation betw een w ealth and 
s ubs idy probably unders tate the tru e magnitude of  the pro - affluent 
advantage . First, one of  our meas ures  of  w ealth — policy coverage 
limit — is  capped by Citizens ’ rules , w hich means  that w e are not 
meas uring the true w ealth of  the p eople who buy maximal coverage, and 
are theref ore deriving dow nw ard - bias ed correlations. Second, Citizens ’ 
report of the s ubs id ies — the indicated rate changes — u nders tates  the 
s ubs idies ’  true magnitude . Citizens  does  not take into account s ome of  
the cos ts  of  providing ins urance — cos ts  that private ins urers  w ould incur  
in  running an ins urance s cheme. Specifically, w hen Citizens  calculates  
the amount of  the indicated rate change, it does  not build into it the  cos t 
of  reins urance — an ins urance res erve  neces s ary to protect it agains t the 
ris k of  pricing errors  or unexpected  spikes in los s es.  Citizens  does  not 
need require s uch a res erve, becaus e of  its  power in ef f ect to tax the 
citizenry or to as s es s  all ins urance purchas e rs  in the s tate of  F lorida.   
We have not tried to identif y the caus al s tory underlying this  
correlati on , nor are w e interes ted in its  direction . Causation may go 
either w ay: greater w ealth may help people secure greater s ubs idies ; or 
greater s ubs idies  may help people move into more expensive homes. We 
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are not interes ted in caus ation becaus e the troubling f eature of  the s ys tem 
has  nothing to do w ith any caus al theory. The problem  is the large 
positive cor r elation  betw een w ealth and s ubs idy, a correlation that 
conf licts  w ith the goals  and underlying rhetoric j us tif ying the program.  
 
3.  Redistribution under  the NFIP  
A s  w e s aw  in P art II, the N F IP  ins ures  over 5 million properties, 
up to $350,000 per residential property. The program is  not des igned to 
be f inancially balanced. In fact, s ubs idized rates  w ere thought by 
law makers  to be an inducement f or communities  to participate in the 
program and adopt flood mitigation requirement s  f or buildings  and 
f loodplains management.  
Although in mos t years  the N F IP  collects  enough premiums to 
cover each year’s  claims , a f ew  catas trophic events  more than w ipe out 
the N F IP ’s  re s erves. Currently, in 2014, the N F IP ’s  debt exceeds  $24 
billion. Present rate s etting practices  are “ unlikely to be able to cover the 
program’s  claims , expenses, and debt, exposing the f ederal government 
and ultimately taxpayers to ever - greater f inancial ris ks , especially in 
years  of  catas trophic flooding.” 7 9  
As a res ult of  the dis counts , people insured by the N F IP  pay only 
a f raction of  the f ull - ris k premium. In 2006, F EM A  es timated this  
f raction to be 35 – 40 percent. The subs idy is , on average, clos e to two -
thirds  of  the economic cos t. An average premium charged by the N F IP  
w as  $721, but w ould cos t betw een $1800 – $2060 if  priced to cover f ull 
ris k. 80  In the highes t f lood ris k areas , the f raction of  f ull ris k paid by 
policyholders  is  even low er. 81  
A 2007 repo rt by the Congres s ional Budget O f f ice (CBO ) f ound 
that “properties covered under the N F IP  tend to be more valuable than 
other properties nationw ide.” At the time, the median value of  a home in 
the U.S. was $160,000; the median value es timated f or homes  ins ured by 
the N F IP  ranged f rom $220,000 to $400,000. The CBO  f ound that 
“ much of  the dif f erence is  attributable to the higher property values  in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79  U.S. G O V ’ T  A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y  O F F I C E ,  G A O - 0 9 - 1 2 ,  F L O O D  I N S U R A N C E :  
F E M A ’ S  R A T E  S E T T I N G  P R O C E S S  W A R R A N T S  A T T E N T I O N  4 – 5  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  
h t tp://w w w.ga o.go v / a s s e t s / 2 9 0 / 2 8 3 0 3 5.pdf [ h e r e i n a f t e r  G A O - 0 9 - 1 2 ,  F L O O D  
I N S U R A N C E ].  
80  C B O ,  V A L U E  O F  P R O P E R T I E S ,  s u p r a  n o t e  6 8 ,  a t  3.  
81  P R I C E W A T E R H O U S E C O O P E R S  L L P ,  S T U D Y  O F  T H E  E C O N O M I C  E F F E C T S  O F  
C H A R G I N G  A C T U A R I A L L Y  B A S E D  P R E M I U M  R A T E S  F O R  P R E - F I R M  S T R U C T U R E S  5 -
5  ( 1 9 9 9 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  at  h t tp://w w w.fe m a.go v / m e d i a - l i b r a r y - d a t a / 2 0 1 3 0 7 2 6 - 1 6 0 2 -
2 0 4 9 0 - 9 0 3 1 / f i n a l r eport.pdf  
! #&’ #!
area that are clos e to w ater.” 8 2  There are 130 million homes  in the U.S, 
but only a s mall f raction of  them receive  s ubs idized N F IP  policies. Of 
thos e w ho do, nearly 80 percent are located in counties  that rank in the 
w ealthies t quintile. 83  
Despite the image — of ten invoked in political debates  over f lood 
ins urance 8 4 — of  the s ubs idy going to s truggling middle - class 
homeow ne rs  w ho have lived f or generations  in f loodplains, the reality is  
dif f erent. “40 percent of  the s ubs idized coas t properties in the s ample are 
w orth more than $500,000; 12 percent are w orth more than $1 
million.” 8 5  Thes e are f ar higher proportions than in the  res t of  the 
country. For inland properties  (the great maj ority of  w hich do not 
purchase f lood ins urance)  only 15 percent are w orth more than $500,00 
and only 3 percent more than $1million.  
The myth of  the s ubs idized s truggling  homeow ner is  f urther 
dispel led by another s triking f act : 23 percent of  s ubs idized coas tal 
properties are not the policyholders ’ principal residence — they are either 
vacation homes  or year - round rentals. Indeed, thes e s ubs idized s econd 
homes  in coas tal areas  are generally higher in va lue than the s ubs idized 
principal residences  in the s ame coas tal areas  ($634,000 vers us  
$530,000). 86  Thus , even among the group of benef iciaries  w ho live along 
the coas t and w ho disproportionately enj oy the s ubs idy, s econd - homers  
are the bigger gainers  f rom  the s ubs idy. 47 percent of  the s ubs idized 
homes  that are not principal residences  are w orth more than $500,000 
(and 15 percent w orth more than $1 million). 87  
Another indication that w ealthier hous eholds  enj oy the N F IP  
s ubs idy is  the f raction of  homes  that purchase the maximum coverage. 
Low - value homes  ow ned by low er income res idents  do not need (and are 
ineligible f or) the maximum coverage; high - value homes  do. In 2002, 
only 11 percent of  N F IP  policies w ere at maximum limit. By 2012, the 
f raction increas ed to 42 percent, w ith mos t of  thes e high - coverage homes  
located in the G ulf  Coas t and Eas tern Coas t s tates. For example, in N e w  
Y ork (w ith a median home value of  $285,300) ,  65 percent of  its  
policyholders  had  the maximum coverage. In contras t, in West V irginia 
(a median home value of  $99,300) , only 7 percent of  its  policyholders  
had  maximum coverage. 88  
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F inally, the benef it to coas tal areas , w hich tend to have higher 
property value, accrues  in another les s  direct w ay. Participation in the 
N F IP  requires  co mmunities  to develop floodplain management plans. 
Such inves tment s  reduce f l o od ris k and increas e the land available f or 
new  cons truction. In ef f ect, the “ N F IP , by s erving as  a backs top for thos e 
ris ks , f avors  development in communities  w ith f loodplains, b y s hif ting 
s ome of  thos e ris ks  onto taxpayers.” 8 9  
 
B.  Investment Distortions  
 
In S ection A  w e as ked w hether government ins urance produces 
the des irable dis tributive ef f ects  aspired by its  political proponents, of  
improving af f ordability among low er income res i dents  of  f loodplains. 
We saw  that the opposite is true — that the benef its  of  the program f low  
disproportionately to the af f luent. We now  turn to examine another 
troubling dis tortion of  the exi s ting government ins urance programs: the  
ef f ect on total w elf are.  
 
1.  Regulation of L ocation  
In choos ing the location of  development (and redevelopment), 
people have to es timate the perils of  particular s ites. Coastal areas  are 
attractive f or many s alient reas ons , w hich f eature prominently in buyers ’ 
calculations. The dow n s ide — exposure to s evere s torms — is  recognized 
in the abs tract, but hard to quantif y.  
Insurance, if  priced accurately, provides an important s ervice of  
quantif ying the ris k  and helping people  trade it of f  agains t the upsides. 
This is  a general (des irable) f eature of  ins urance, operating in ef f ect like 
a P igouvian tax in internalizing an otherw is e overlooked cos t. 90  Know ing 
the expected cos t of  exposure to w eather dis as ter, people are more likely 
to make an inf ormed cos t - benef it calculation in choos ing locatio ns . 
Subsidized ins urance rates  des troy the inf ormation value of  f ull - ris k 
premiums, thus  s uppressing  the true cos t of  living in  s evere w eather 
zones , and creating an exces s ive incentive to populate attractive but 
dangerous  locations.  It is a moral hazard p roblem occurring at the 
dimens ion of  the activity level.  
We saw  that the N F IP  charges  s ubs idized premiums deliber ately  
to make ins urance af f ordable. 91  This  intent w as  punctuated by the  
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enactment of  the s o - called H omeow ner F lood Ins urance A f f ordability 
A c t  of  2014 , w hich s caled back premium increas es  that intended  to 
eliminate the s ubs idies . But there are additional, unintentional caus e s  f or 
the inaccurate premiums s et by the N F IP.  F irs t, the data it relies  on in 
draw ing f lood m aps is outdated.   Despite the  ef f orts  to update  and 
modernize  the maps, the long lapses betw een s uch adj us tments  are 
indicative of  the inadequate political or f inancial incentive s  to run an 
actuarially accurate s ys tem. For example, Hurricane S andy exposed the 
inadequacy of  F EM A ’s  old f lood maps and led to an updating of  high -
ris k area s . Under the new  maps, “a $429 annual premium on a s tructure 
previously outs ide the high - ris k zone could w ell ris e to $5000 to $10,000 
f or the s ame amount of  coverage if  it is  ins ide the high - ris k area.” 9 2   
Second , the  N F IP  charges  s ubs idized premiums becaus e it allow s  
certain properties to maintain  their previous his torically low  rates , 
despite data s how ing a great er  ris k. FEMA does  not even collect data on 
thes e grandf athered properties  to m eas ure their f i nancial impact on the 
program and does  not even keep track of  how  many of  thes e properties 
there are . Further, the agency s ets  f lood ins urance rates  on a nationw ide 
bas is  us ing rough averages , w hich means  that many f actors  relevant to 
f lood ris k are not sp ecifically accounted f or in rating  individual 
properties.  Normally s uch crude averaging w ould lead to advers e 
s election and unraveling ,  as  low - ris k properties  s hould prefer to  exit  and 
j oin s eparate pools with actuarially f air policies ,  rather than s ubs idize 
other neighborhoods. B ut if  the  government  s ubs idy is  deep  enough , it 
can  of f s et this  ef f ect. Finally , a s  a government report conceded, 
“ F EM A ’s  rate - s etting process als o does  not f ully take into account 
ongoing and planned development, long - term trends  in eros ion, or the 
ef f ects  of  global climate change, although private s ector models  are 
incorporating s ome of  thes e f actors. ” 9 3  
Underpricing of  f lood ins urance in coas tal  areas  has  long been 
as s ociated w ith (and likely  contributed to) exces s ive priva te development 
of  f lood zones. As the s a m e  Congres s ional report concluded, “ F EM A  . . . 
is unable, through its  rate - s etting process, to inf orm policyholders  of  the 
ris k to their property from eros ion. Consequently, in s ome cas es  f lood 
ins urance rates  may s e nd a f als e s ignal that unders tates  the ris k exposure 
f aced by current policyholders  or prospective development.” 9 4  And in 
w riting about F lorida’s  Citizens  w ind  ins urance s cheme, w riter M ichael  
Lew is  explains that F lorida “ s old its  citizens  catas trophe insurance at 
roughly one - s ixth the market rates , thus  encouraging them to live in 
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ris kier places than they w ould if  they had to pay what the mar ket 
charged .” 9 5  
Whether climate change is  indeed caus ing a more s evere pattern 
of  catas trophic storm s  may s till be debated. 96  It is  clear that the cos ts  of  
hurricanes , f or example, ha ve  increas ed dramat ically over the past 
generation . But s trikingly, much of  the upward  trend in s torm los s  data, 
af ter caref ul adj us tment f or s ocietal f actors , can be explained not by 
w eather f luctuations  but rather by increas ed concentration of  property in 
dangerous  areas , namely — by  human decis ions  to locate more dens ely  in 
the s torms ’ paths.  “The maj or caus e of  trends  in los s es  related to 
w eather and climate extremes  is  s ocietal f actors : the grow th of  w ealth 
w ith more valuable property at ris k, increas ing dens ity of  property, and 
demographic shif ts  to coas tal areas  and s torm - prone areas  that are 
experiencing increas ing urbanization.” 9 7   
Indeed,  according to the U.S. Census Bureau  the number of  
people living in coas tal areas  in F lorida increas ed by ten million people, 
almos t four fold , betw een 1960 and 2008. Coastal exposur e now  
represents 79 percent of  all property exposure in F lorida, w ith an ins ured 
value of  $2.8 trillion (in 2012). 98  Major hurricanes  did nothing to s top 
this migration. It is es timated that s ince H urricane A ndrew  s truck the 
F lorida coas t in 1992, developme nt more than doubled the property 
value on its  path. The $25 billion in total economic los s es  in 1992 
“ w ould have res ulted in more than tw ice that amount — $55 billion —
w ere it to have occurred in 2005, given current as s et values ” (even 
holding cons tant the v alue of  building material, real es tate, and other 
s ocietal changes ) .99  
The ef f ects  of  climate change on w eather patterns  are only 
beginning to be unders tood ,  but  private ins urers  are rus hing to take thes e  
emerging patterns into account,  adj us ting premium s  in light of  near 
f uture projections , and s tudying potential indus try - w ide impacts and 
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s trategies  to proactively addres s  the ris ing ris k. 10 0  FEM A , on the other 
hand,  “ has  done little to develop the kind of  inf ormation needed to 
unders tand the long - term expos ure of  N F IP  to climate change f or a 
variety of  reas ons. NFIP’s  ris k management processes  adapt to near - term 
changes  in w eather as  they af f ect exis ting data. As a res ult, N F IP  is  
des igned to as s es s  and ins ure agains t current — not f uture — ris ks  and 
currently d oes  not have the inf ormation neces s ary to adj us t rates  f or the 
potential impacts of  events  as s ociated w ith climate.” 1 0 1  If , indeed, 
climate change poses increas ed ris k s  of  f lood and eros ion to low  lying 
coas tal zones , the f ailure of  government ins urance to p rice the ris k into 
presen t policies exacerbates  the over development problem.   
A n independent report of eros ion rates  and their f inancial impact 
found that over the next s ixty years , eros ion may claim one out of  f our 
hous es  w ithin 500 f eet of  the U.S. shore line, as  the f ollow ing picture 
illus trates : 1 0 2  
 
Figure 7 Here  
 
H ow ever, t he N F IP  does  not map erosion hazard and does  not 
incorporate it into the ins urance rate. As a res ult, rates  are s et at  
approximately  half  of  actuarially accurate rates.  “Despite facing  higher 
ris k, homeow ners  in eros ion - prone areas  currently are paying the s ame 
amount f or f lood ins urance as  are policyholders  in non - eroding areas .” 1 0 3  
Not only w ill eros ion claims  have to be s ubs idized, but present ins urance 
rates  are als o “ mis leading to us ers ” becaus e they do not inf orm  
homeow ners  of  the eros ion ris k . As a res ult, the report finds  that 
development in eros ion areas  is  exces s ive. “In the abs ence of  ins urance 
and other programs to reduce f lood ris k, development dens ity w ould be 
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about 25 percen t low er in the highes t - ris k zones  than in areas  les s  
s us ceptible to damage f rom coas tal f looding.” 1 0 4  
The ef f ect of  the government ins urance s ubs idy on homeow ners ’  
location decis ion s  can be  f urther  captured by the f ollow ing f inding. In 
some of  the areas  clos es t to the s horeline, annual rates  have to be s et at  a 
w hopping $11.40 per $100 of  coverage to meet the ris k projections —
over 10 percent of  property value each year! A t the s ame time, a  s urvey 
of  homeow ners  f ound that participation in ins uran ce s cheme s  w ith s uch 
high premiums w ould be “ quite low ” —  about half  of  f lood policyholders  
are only w illing to pay up to $1 – $2/year per $100 of  coverage .10 5  
Not s urprisingly, given the s ubs tantial s ubs idy provided by N F IP  
ins urance and the increas ed developm ent along coas tal areas , the number 
of  policies is s ued by the N F IP  increas ed in the past generation f rom 1.9 
million to over 4.6 million. 10 6  Some of  thes e policyholders  have lived in 
the area long bef ore  the N F IP . But many are new comers , representing a 
repop ulation enterprise facilitated by dis torted ins urance contracts. Many 
of  thes e new comers  w ould not have moved to their present high - ris k 
location , or w ould not have paid the s ame top dollar,  in the abs ence of  
s ubs idized premiums . Indeed, one of  the maj or c omplaints of  exis ting 
homeow ners  agains t the Biggert - Waters  A ct of  2012 (w hich, recall, 
dramatically s caled back the N F IP  s ubs idies ) w a s  their inability to af f ord 
the new  premiums and how  the new  premiums w e re s caring aw ay 
potential buyers  and making mortg age loans  unaf f ordable .10 7  
 
2.  Regulation of Pr ecautions  
Ins urance contracts  af f ect not only the s cope of activity, but als o 
the level of  care taken by policyholders. Auto ins urance, f or example, 
can induce people to drive more caref ully (through experience rating); 
environmental liability ins urance can induce f irms  to ins tall spill 
prevention meas ures ; and f ire ins urance can induce proprietors to inves t 
in  sprinklers. 10 8  How  does  government ins urance of  w eather ris k perform 
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as a ris k mitigation mechanis m?  H is torically, not very w ell.  As 
dis cus s ed above, the f lood  maps used by F EM A  to adminis ter the N F IP  
are notorious ly out of  date.  And even w hen they are up to date, the 
premiums are  heavily s ubs idized f or many properties in the highes t ris k 
areas , giving little incentive to ins tall los s  reducing meas ures .   
This  s ituation s eemed to be changing af ter the enactment of  
Biggert - Waters  in 2012, as  rapid premium increas es  began to induce  
behavioral changes  on the part of property owners.  Under the new  maps 
that w ere to be us ed, the af f ordability of  ins urance depended u pon, 
among other things , how  high one’s  home w as  built above certain 
expected f lood levels.  H omeow ners  rebuilding in N ew  Y ork, N ew  
J ers ey, and Connecticut f ollow ing H urricane  S andy  w ere induced to 
inves t in s tilts , rais ing their homes  above the bas e f lood  elevation .10 9  
Whether this  trend w ill continue now  that Biggert - Waters  has  been cut 
back remains  to be s een.  
Compared to f lood mitigation, t he role of  government ins urance 
in encouraging w ind mitigation is  perhaps more encouraging , although it 
is  dif f icult to know  f or certain .  In Florida, f or example, Citizens  
provides dis counts  to any of  its  policyholders  w ho can demons trate that 
the property they are ins uring meets  a lis t of  highly detailed des ign 
specifications. 11 0  Indeed, in F lorida all ins urers — private a nd public — are 
required by s tatute to provide s uch dis counts. 11 1   Becaus e w ind 
mitigation dis counts  in F lorida are a matter of  s tatutory mandate, it is 
impossible to determine w hat s orts  of  w ind mitigation dis counts  a private 
ins urer , abs ence s uch a mandate,  w ould be w illing to provide .  A similar 
picture can be s een in  other coas tal s tates. 11 2   For this  reas on, it is  
dif f icult to document a “ care level” advantage on the part of private 
ins urers  w ith respect to coas tal w ind mitigation.   
It is  eas y to s ee, how ever, the cons iderable “ activity level” 
advantage that private ins urance has  over government ins urance of  
coas tal w eather ris k.  If private ins urers  w ere permitted to charge w hat 
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the market w ould bear f or coas tal w eather ris k (and w er e not limited by 
s tate ins urance regulators ), the prices would be cons iderably higher than 
they currently are , especially f or the ris kies t communities  living clos e to 
w a t e r .  This claim is  s upported by anecdotal evidence. 11 3   It is  s upported 
by the s hort exp erience of  rate hikes  under the Biggert - Waters  A ct, 
w hich  “ s cared the bej es us  out of  people.”  1 1 4   A nd it is  s upported by 
Citizens  data, w here the s ubs idies  f or coas tal w ind ins urance ref lect the 
dif f erence betw een w hat Citizens  actually charges  f or s uch ris ks  and 
w hat an actuarially accurate ins urance premium w ould be.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION :  THE END OF G OVERNMENT W EATHER INSURANCE ?  
 
G overnment ins urance f or w eather ris k is  s ubs idized. Either 
through dis as ter relief  or through individually purchased ins urance 
poli cies, people living in the zone of  dis as ter pay only a f raction of  the 
expected cos t. It is a s ubs idy program w ith great political s upport, resting 
on a popular belief  that it is  both f air and ef f icient. This article s how ed 
that both perceptions are w rong.  In delivering a s ubs idy that private 
ins urance does  not give, government ins urance inf licts  tw o dis tortions : 
regres s ive redis tribution and inef f icient inves tment in res idential 
property. These dis tortions  are not inherent to the f unction of  ins urance. 
They can be attenuated, and perhaps solved, by a return to private 
ins urance markets.  
In the cours e of  developi ng this  argument — the comparative 
performance of  government vers us  private ins urance — one cannot 
overlook the primary rationale f or government takeover of  w eather ris k 
ins urance: market penetration. The argument is  s traightf orw ard: w hen 
ins urance is  provided  through a relief  f und or w ith s ignif icant s ubs id ies , 
coverage can extend beyond w hat private  ins urance markets  provide, and 
res olve the markets  f ailures  of  private ins urance . Weather ris k, it is  
alleged, is  one s uch circums tance.   In thes e concluding rema rks , w e 
examine the concern f or market f ailures  in the provision of  private 
ins urance.  
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O ne possible concern w ith private ins urance f or w eather ris k is  
underins urance. Due to cognitive f ailures , homeow ners  buy too little 
coverage. 11 5  For example, it is  es tima ted that only 20% of  homeow ners  
in high f lood ris k areas  in N ew  Y ork City w ho are not required to 
purchase ins urance actually purchase coverage, even at s ubs idized rates.  
1 1 6  How ever, s evere w eather is  an odd area f or s uch an argument to be 
made. Surely peop le notice reports about w eather dis as ters. If anything, 
they tend to be overly s alient relative to other ins ured ris ks  (thus  
triggering a s alience bias ). Indeed, it is  es timated that f or every person 
who dies  in a s torm, 140 people must die f rom f amine to receive the 
s ame expected media coverage. 11 7  
What is  les s  s urprising, perhaps, is the f ailure of  homeow ners  to 
recognize that s tandard homeow ners  ins urance policies exclude f lood -
caus ed damage. Since much of  the des truction due to s evere w eather is  
f lood - related, it is  excluded and of f ered as  a s eparate contractual add - on. 
Notwiths tanding mandated dis clos ures  that alert people and remind them 
to purchase s epa rate f lood ins urance, it is  ques tionable w hether s uch 
w arnings  appended to complex preprinted ins urance policies could 
s ucces s f ully inf orm people .11 8  The res ulting gap in coverage is  a market 
f ailure that government ins urance can s tep in to correct. And yet,  a more 
modes t intervention can res olve this  problem. Instead of  being the 
provider of  ins urance,  the government can s imply mandate f lood 
ins urance  in areas  w here s ome cos ts  are otherw is e s hif ted to the public  
(as  it does  f or homes  w ith f ederally guarantee d mortgage loans ). The 
mandate w ould us her people to ins urance markets , w ithout the need f or 
government s ubs idy of  policies.  
Another concern w ith private ins urance f or w eather ris k is  the 
capacity to ins ure mega - dis as ters. W eather - related ris ks  are commonl y 
regarded as  only partially ins urable  becaus e of  the problem of  ris k 
correlation. It is conventional w is dom that private ins urance markets  w ill 
f ail to perform their ris k - spreading f unction w hen the ins ured ris ks  are 
correlated w ith each other — w hen too ma ny of  the members  of  the 
ins urance pool face the s ame ris k and incur their los s  in the s ame 
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circums tances. 11 9  That a number of  ins urers  became ins olvent in the 
af termath of  maj or hurricanes  reinf orces  the notion that the mos t extreme 
cas es  of  s evere w eather are j us t too big f or private ins urance to handle 
alone.  
But is  that in f act true?  Is  extreme w eather ris k actually 
unins urable through private markets ?  A t leas t s ince the 1990s , af ter the 
N orthridge Earthquake and H urricane A ndrew  dis as ters  exposed the 
inadequacy of  capital that w as  then being deployed in cat as trophe 
reins urance markets , concerns  have been expressed about the “ capacity” 
of  private markets  to handle the once - in - a - generation dis as ter .12 0   In  
theory, it is  not clear w hy even the larges t s torms  s hould not be 
ins urable, given the amount of  capital av ailable in the w orld to provide a 
hedge agains t s uch ris ks.  Even large correlated r is ks  on the local or 
national level are  uncorrelated and manageable, in terms  of  ris k 
spreading ,  on a global level.  This is  w hat reins urance markets  do: they 
take the ris k s  ins ured by individual ins urance companies around the 
w orld, pool them together, and then dis tribute them acros s  inves tors  
w orldw ide.  So why are  s o f ew  as s ets  allocated to catas trophe 
reins urance markets ?  
A  range of  explanations  have been of f ered f or the  apparent 
shortage of  reins urance capital , including tax incentives , agency cos ts , 
and exploitation of  market power . 12 1   At the s ame time,  ins urance 
market s  ha ve  responded with a w ave of  f inancial innovation des igned to 
increas e the market’s  s upply of catas t rophic reins urance capacity.  1 2 2   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119  S e e ,  e . g . ,  G e o r g e  L. P r i e s t ,  T h e  G o v e r n m e nt, the  M a r k et, a n d  the  P r o b l e m  o f  
C atastro p h i c  L o s s ,  1 2  J. R i s k  &  U n c e r t a i n t y  2 1 9 ,  2 2 2  ( 1 9 9 6 )  ( “ T h e  l a w  o f  l a r g e  
n u m b e r s  w i l l  n o t  apply… i f  t h e  r i s k s  f a c e d  b y  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  pool a r e  n o t  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i n d epend e n t  t o  s o m e  d e g r e e.”).  
120  S e e ,  e . g . ,  D w i g h t  M. J a f f e e  &  T h o m a s  R u s s e l l ,  C atastro p h e  I n s u r a n c e ,  C a p ital 
M a r k ets, a n d  U n i n s u r a b l e  R i s k s ,  6 4  J.  R I S K  &  I N S . 2 0 5  ( 1 9 9 7 ) ;  T H E  F I N A N C I N G  O F  
C A T A S T R O P H E  R I S K  ( K e n n e t h  F r o o t  e d., 1 9 9 9 ).  
121  S e e ,  e . g . ,  J a f f e e  &  R u s s e l l ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 2 0 ,  a t  2 0 9 – 1 6  ( a r g u i n g  t h a t  v a r i o u s  
“ i n s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s , ”  s u c h  a s  a c c o u n t i n g ,  t a x ,  a n d  t a k e o v e r  r i s k ,  m a k e  i n s u r e r s  
r e l u c t a n t  t o  a c c u m u l a t e  t h e  l i q u i d  c apita l  n e c e s s a r y  t o  prov i d e  f u l l  c a t a s t r ophic  r i s k  
c o v e r a g e ) ;  K e n n e t h  A. F r o o t ,  I ntro d u ctio n ,  i n  T H E  F I N A N C I N G  O F  C A T A S T R O P H E  
R I S K  1 ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 2 0  ( d i s c u s s i n g  a  r a n g e  o f  f a c t o r s  t h a t  i n h i b i t  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  
o f  c apita l  t o  prov i d e  c a t a s t r ophic  r e i n s u r a n c e ).  
122  S e e ,  e . g . ,  D a v i d  C. C r o s o n  &  H o w a r d  C. K u n r e u t h e r ,  C u stom i z i n g  I n d e m n ity 
C o ntra cts a n d  I n d e x e d  C at B o n d s  f o r  N atura l  H a z a r d  R i s k s ,  1  J.  R I S K  &  F I N . 2 4  
( 2 0 0 0 ) ;  J. D a v i d  C u m m i n s ,  C A T  B o n d s  a n d  Othe r  R i s k - L i n k e d  S e c u r itie s :  State o f  
the  M a r k et a n d  R e c e nt D e v e l o p m e nts,  1 1  R I S K  M G M T . &  I N S . R E V . 2 3  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ;  N e i l  
A. D o h e r t y ,  F i n a n c i a l  I n n o v atio n  i n  the  M a n a g e m e nt o f  C atastro p h e  R i s k ,  1 0  J.  
A P P L I E D  C O R P . F I N . 8 4  ( 1 9 9 7 ) ;  J a f f e e  &  R u s s e l l ,  s u p r a  n o t e  1 2 0 ;  M a r t i n  N e l l  &  
A n d r e a s  R i c h t e r ,  I m p r o v i n g  R i s k  A l l o c atio n  T h r o u g h  I n d e x e d  C at B o n d s ,  2 9  
G E N E V A  P A P E R S  O N  R I S K  &  I N S . 1 8 3  ( 2 0 0 4 ).  
! #’’ #!
O ne of  the mos t promising developments in building capital res erves  f or  
mega - catas trophes has  occurred in s ecurities  markets — the development 
of  the catas trophic bond (“ cat bond”).   
Cat bonds  are tradable debt s ecurities  iss ued by ins urers. They 
are s old to inves tors  in capital markets  and promise a generous  interes t 
rate .  What dis tinguis hes  thes e bonds  f rom regular debt ins truments  is  
that the payment of  interes t and the repayment of  principal are 
contingent upon the non - oc currence of  s ome catas trophe - related 
trigger. 12 3  Thus , if  a mega - s torm occurs  that triggers  the cat bond, the 
ins urer  w ho is s ued the bonds  is  relieved f rom the obligation to redeem 
the bond. The ins urer is  in ef f ect able  to us e the principal to  cover s torm -
r elated los s es.  Thus, a s  the us e of  cat bonds  has  been expanding  rapidly 
over the past two decades , the capacity  f or the private ins urability of  
extreme w eather ris ks  continues  to expand as w ell. 12 4  I n the abs ence of  
publicly provided catas trophe insurance  t his  expansion w ould have likely 
been greater.  
If ins uring capacity is  not an ins urmountable  problem f or  private 
ins urance  of  w eather ris k , af f ordability may w ell be.  In areas  s ubj ect to 
s evere w eather, private ins urance is  of f ered, but  priced at f ull ris k  it is 
expensive , and f or many unaf f ordable . True, w ithout ins urance thes e 
homeow ners  w ould als o be unable to rebuild their property if  los t, and 
ins uring it might be a rational cos t - minimizing choice. But it is  s till a 
luxury that many cannot af f ord  (and, as  explained above, w ere not 
f actoring in  w hen moving to the area) . Imagine, then, communities  in 
w hich many res idents  are unins ured agains t w eather devas tation. What 
w ould happen in thes e communities  af ter a dis as trous  s torm ?  
Collectively - provided dis as ter relief  is  the common response. We 
des cribed in P art II the f ederal s tatutory f ramew ork f or dis as ter relief. 
But this  organized relief  f ramew ork merely pr ovides s tructure and 
unif ormity, and perhaps bolsters ,  w hat w ould otherw is e be a spontaneous  
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a ction on part of s ociety. Major dis as ters  have a w ay of  arous ing a s trong 
urge to s upport the victims. Such catas trophes generate an extraordinary 
amount of  media attention and trigger a demand by the public to lend a 
collective hand — paid for by taxpayers — to the unlucky f ew , culminating 
in special legis lative action to appropriate f unds. The September 11 t h  
attacks , f or example, were unprecedented not only in their magnitude, 
but als o in the w ay they def ied a s ens e of  normality and the expectations  
of  public  saf ety.  It is  theref ore unders tandable that s uch an event 
res ulted in the enactment of  the mos t generous  victim compensation f und 
in A merican his tory. 12 5   
The emergence of  s uch ad - hoc f unds  f or relief  f rom dis as ters  not 
covered by exis ting s tatutes  is  a te s tament to the collective’s  conviction 
that s hif ting the los s  f rom the direct victims  is  a w ay to mitigate the 
overall devas tating impact of a dis as ter. For one, the los s  is  thus  borne by 
a broader pool of payers, unable to drain the high marginal utility regions  
of  people’s welf are  f unctions . Moreover, w ith the geographical 
concentration of  victims , dis as ters  have a “ s uper - additive” impact, 
des troying not only the s um of  the individual properties or lives , but 
entire communities.  Thus, unlike more routine  los s  events  (s uch as  thos e 
that f all below  the dis as ter declaration thres hold), relief  paid out f or truly 
catas trophic disas ters  is  not regarded as  a bailout of  the irresponsibly 
unins ured. 12 6     
When the magnitude of  des truction caus ed by w eather dis as ters  is 
exceptionally high relative to past traj ectories — w hen they reach more 
victims  at greater s cale and caus e deeper misery than prior patterns 
predict — ad hoc relief  is  s et in motion. Hurricanes  K atrina and S andy are 
examples of s uch events , exceptional in the magnitude and s cope of 
harm and des truction they inf licted on entire communities. 12 7  The 
corresponding f ederal dis as ter relief  f or the 2005 hurricane s eas on and 
f or H urricane S andy  totaled $109 billion and $ 66 billion, respectively .12 8  
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If  dis as ter relief  is  an irres is tible ins tinct of  a decent s ociety, it is  
a s ocial ins urance s cheme that people — especially if  unins ured through 
ordinary means — can rely on. It matters  not that many of  the victims  
could have purchased ins urance  (does  the Coas t G uard ref rain f r om 
res cuing a drow ning ves s el that f ailed to equip itself  w ith adequate lif e 
boats ?)  This  s ocial ins urance can be eliminated if  people buy ins urance 
policies. Hence, the government’s  s ubs idy of  s uch policies can be 
unders tood as  an attempt to shif t f rom f unding completely f ree ex post 
relief  to f unding a cos t - s haring s cheme.  
We can end this  article w ith a call f or ending government - run 
w eather ins urance, replacing it w ith pinpointed need - bas ed s ubs idies. 
This w ould eliminate the inef f icient incentives  to develop and redevelop 
coastal land, as  w ell as  the regres s ive redis tribution. But where  is the 
s ens e in s uch naïve proposal? Congres s  did enact a law  to eliminate the 
f lood ins urance s ubs idies — a bipartisan law  remarkably passed in the 
peak days  of  partisan  gridlock — only to quickly tos s  it out in an even 
more w idely s upported bill. Insurance af f ordability, it turns  out, is  one of  
the mos t ef f ective political calls  to arms , res ulting here in a premium 
s cheme that w ill likely remain in place for decades. We ca n only 
contribute to clarif ying its  enormous  s ocial cos t.  
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Table 1: Regressions using Log Absolute Subsidy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Coverage w/ Policy FE w/ Territory SE Cluster w/ Policy FE (Terr Cluster) Log HH Value (ZIP Cluster) w/ Policy FE (ZIP Cluster)
log coverage 1.052!!! 1.052!!! 1.052!!! 1.052!!!
(252.20) (252.22) (13.64) (13.64)
Iptype 1 0.108! 0.108! -0.0118
(2.56) (2.56) (-0.05)
log hh 0.484!!! 0.484!!!
(4.05) (4.05)
cons -7.645!!! -7.647!!! -7.645!!! -7.647!!! -0.675 -0.675
(-150.40) (-150.42) (-8.13) (-8.14) (-0.47) (-0.47)
N 339046 339046 339046 339046 339038 339038
t statistics in parentheses
! p < 0.05, !! p < 0.01, !!! p < 0.001
1
Table 1: Regression with % Subsidies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Coverage w/ Policy FE w/ Territory SE Cluster w/ Policy FE (Terr Cluster) Log HH Value (ZIP Cluster) w/ Policy FE (ZIP Cluster)
logcoverage 0.847
!!!
0.796
!!!
0.847
!!!
0.796
!!!
(126.81) (117.87) (8.04) (7.51)
Iptype1 0.806
!!!
0.806
!
0.945
!!!
(46.64) (2.36) (3.55)
loghh 0.571
!!!
0.484
!!!
(4.19) (3.60)
cons -8.320
!!!
-7.914
!!!
-8.320
!!!
-7.914
!!!
-4.890
!!
-4.090
!
(-101.61) (-96.30) (-6.45) (-6.26) (-2.93) (-2.51)
N 527250 527250 527250 527250 527236 527236
t statistics in parentheses
! p < 0.05, !! p < 0.01, !!! p < 0.001
1
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Omri Ben-Shahar 
 omri@uchicago.edu 
 
 Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
For a listing of papers 1600 please go to Working Papers at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
601. David A. Weisbach, Should Environmental Taxes Be Precautionary? June 2012 
602. Saul Levmore, Harmonization, Preferences, and the Calculus of Consent in Commercial and Other 
Law, June 2012 
603. David S. Evans, Excessive Litigation by Business Users of Free Platform Services, June 2012 
604. Ariel Porat, Mistake under the Common European Sales Law, June 2012 
605. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contrat Evolution, June 2012 
606. Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, International Paretianism: A Defense, July 2012
607 Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law, July 2012 
608. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, July 2012 
609. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic 
Cooperation, July 2012 
610. M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Reverse Regulatory Arbitrage: An Auction Approach to 
Regulatory Assignments, August 2012 
611. Joseph Isenbergh, Cliff Schmiff, August 2012 
612. James Melton and Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?, September 
2014 
613. M. Todd Henderson, Voice versus Exit in Health Care Policy, October 2012 
614. Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, Becker on Ewald on Foucault on Becker 
American Neoliberalism and Michel Foucaults 1979 Birth of Biopolitics Lectures, October 2012 
615. William H. J. Hubbard, Another Look at the Eurobarometer Surveys, October 2012 
616. Lee Anne Fennell, Resource Access Costs, October 2012 
617. Ariel Porat, Negligence Liability for Non-Negligent Behavior, November 2012 
618. William A. Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson, Becoming the Fifth Branch, November 2012 
619. David S. Evans and Elisa V. Mariscal, The Role of Keyword Advertisign in Competition among 
Rival Brands, November 2012 
620. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and David S. Evans, Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and 
Reliable Index of interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial 
Discussion Paper, November 2012 
621. Reid Thompson and David Weisbach, Attributes of Ownership, November 2012 
622. Eric A. Posner, Balance-of-Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution, November 2012 
623. David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform 
Businesses, December 2012 
624. James Melton, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Kalev Leetaru, On the Interpretability of Law: 
Lessons from the Decoding of National Constitutions, December 2012 
625. Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unemployment and Regulatory Policy, December 2012 
626. David S. Evans, Economics of Vertical Restraints for Multi-Sided Platforms, January 2013 
627. David S. Evans, Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and Its Implications for Antitrust 
Analysis, January 2013 
628. Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis, January 2013 
629. M. Todd Henderson, Can Lawyers Stay in the Drivers Seat?, January 2013 
630. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Altruism Exchanges and the Kidney Shortage, 
January 2013 
631. Randal C. Picker, Access and the Public Domain, February 2013 
632. Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, February 2013 
633. Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cses, February 2013 
634. Arial Porat and Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 
February 2013 
635. Douglas G. Baird and Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, February 2013 
636. Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, No Contract?   March 2013 
637. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, March 2013
638. M. Todd Henderson, Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry, March 2013 
639 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, April 2013 
640. Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation through Boilerplate: An Apologia, April 2013 
 
 641. Anthony J. Casey and Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, May 2013
642. William H. J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum 
Shopping in the New York Courts, May 2013 
643. Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying as Efficient Corporate Governance, May 
2013 
644. Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency 
Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, June 2013 
645. Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur, and Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path 
Dependence, and Temporary Law, June 2013 
646.  Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
  Boards, July 2013 
647.  Mary Anne Case, Is There a Lingua Franca for the American Legal Academy? July 2013 
648.  Bernard Harcourt, Beccarias On Crimes and Punishments: A Mirror of the History of the 
Foundations of Modern Criminal Law, July 2013 
649. Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and Incarceration: An Economic 
Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, July 2013 
650.  Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic 
Rights as Insurance Swaps , August 2013 
651. Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Audits as Signals, August 
2013 
652. Elisabeth J. Moyer, Michael D. Woolley, Michael J. Glotter, and David A. Weisbach, Climate 
Impacts on Economic Growth as Drivers of Uncertainty n the Social Cost of Carbon, August 
2013 
653. Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, A Solution to the Collective Action Problem in Corporate 
Reorganization, September 2013 
654. Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt, Becker and Foucault on Crime and 
Punishment A Conversation with Gary Becker, François Ewald, and Bernard Harcourt: The 
Second Session, September 2013 
655. Edward R. Morrison, Arpit Gupta, Lenora M. Olson, Lawrence J. Cook, and Heather Keenan, 
Health and Financial Fragility: Evidence from Automobile Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy, 
October 2013 
656. Evidentiary Privileges in International Arbitration, Richard M. Mosk and Tom Ginsburg, October 
2013 
657. Voting Squared: Quadratic Voting in Democratic Politics, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, 
October 2013 
658. The Impact of the U.S. Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation on Consumer Welfare: An Event 
Study Analysis, David S. Evans, Howard Chang, and Steven Joyce, October 2013 
659. Lee Anne Fennell, Just Enough, October 2013 
660. Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, April 2014 
661. Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, Crystal S. Yang, 
October 2013 
662. Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence 
from Booker, Crystal S. Yang, March 2014 
663. William H. J. Hubbard, A Theory of Pleading, Litigation, and Settlement, November 2013 
664. Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti, and Daniel Rockmore, We the Peoples: The Global Origins of 
Constitutional Preambles, April 2014 
665. Lee Anne Fennell and Eduardo M. Peæalver, Exactions Creep, December 2013 
666. Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, December 2013 
667. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, A Winners Curse?: Promotions fr m the Lower 
Federal Courts, December 2013 
668. Jose Antonio Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg, Beyond Presidentialism and 
Parliamentarism, December 2013 
669. Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts: The Flawed Conceptual and Evidentiary Basis of 
Article 2s Incorporation Strategy, November 2013 
670. Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus Noninfringement, December 2013 
671. M. Todd Henderson and William H.J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of 
Congressional Control over Judicial Behavior, January 2014 
672. Lisa Bernstein, Copying and Context: Tying as a Solution to the Lack of Intellectual Property 
Protection of Contract Terms, January 2014 
 
 673. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Voting Rules in International Organizations, Ja uary 2014 
674. Tom Ginsburg and Thomas J. Miles, The Teaching/Research Tradeoff in Law: Data from the 
Right Tail, February 2014 
675. Ariel Porat and Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, February 2014 
676. Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Roles in No judicial Functions, February 2014 
677. Matthew B. Kugler, The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the Border: 
An Empirical Study, February 2014 
678. David S. Evans, Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, and Xinzhu Zhang, Assessing Unfair Pricing under 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries, March 2014 
679. Jonathan S. Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, March 2014 
680. Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost Benefit Analysis in Financial 
Disclosure Regulation, March 2014 
681. Yun-chien Chang and Lee Anne Fennell, Partition and Revelation, April 2014 
682. Tom Ginsburg and James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? 
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, May 2014 
683. Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to 
Criticisms, May 2014 
684. Adam B. Badawi and Anthony J. Casey, The Fannie and Freddie Bailouts Through the Corporate 
Lens, March 2014 
685. David S. Evans, Economic Aspects of Bitcoin and Other Decentralized Public-Ledger Currency 
Platforms, April 2014 
686. Preston M. Torbert, A Study of the Risks of Contract Ambiguity, May 2014 
687. Adam S. Chilton, The Laws of War and Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, May 2014 
688. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Disgorgement for Accidents, May 2014
689. David Weisbach, Distributionally-Weighted Cost Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets 
Organizational Design, June 2014 
690. Robert Co ter and Ariel Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents, 
June 2014 
691. William H. J. Hubbard, Nuisance Suits, June 2014 
692. Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Credible Threats, July 2014 
693. Douglas G. Baird, One-and-a-Half Badges of Fraud, August 2014 
694. Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference? August 2014 
695. Maria Bigoni, Stefania Bortolotti, Francesco Parisi, and Ariel Porat, Unbundling Efficient Breach, 
August 2014 
696. Adam S. Chilton and Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship, 
August 2014 
697. David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy, August 2014 
698. Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital Adequacy Requirements? September 
2014 
699. Saul Levmore, Inequality in the Twenty-First Century, August 2014 
700. Adam S. Chilton, Reconsidering the Motivations of the United States? Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Program, July 2014 
701. Dhammika Dharmapala and Vikramaditya S. Khanna, The Costs and Benefits of Mandatory 
Securities Regulation: Evidence from Market Reactions to the JOBS Act of 2012, August 2014 
702. Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting? A Review 
of the Empirical Literature, September 2014 
703. Dhammika Dharmapala, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Simple Conceptual Framework, 
September 2014 
704. Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, Fairness in Law and Economics: Introduction, 
October 2014 
705. Thomas J. Miles and Adam B.Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence 
from ’Secure Communities’, October 2014 
706. Ariel Porat and Omri Yadlin, Valuable Lies, October 2014 
707. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco and Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being and Public Policy, 
November 2014 
708. David S. Evans, The Antitrust Analysis of Rules and Standards for Software Platforms, November 
2014 
 
 709. E. Glen Weyl and Alexander White, Let the Best ’One’ Win: Policy Lessons from the 
New Economics of Platforms, December 2014 
710. Lee Anne Fennell, Agglomerama, December 2014 
711. Anthony J. Casey and Aziz Z. Huq, The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy, December 
2014 
712. Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, The Inefficacy of Constitutional Torture 
Prohibitions, December 2014 
713. Lee Anne Fennell and Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and 
Economics, January 2015 
714. Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle D. Logue, Under the Weather: Government Insurance and the 
Regulation of Climate Risks, January 2015 
 
 
